security: implement tickets #28-#35 + architecture decision #30
#28 - TOTP rate limiting (verifyTotp): added totpRateLimiter (10 req/30s), throws TOO_MANY_REQUESTS before DB hit; 16 unit tests including rate-limit exceeded + userId key isolation. #29 - /api/reports/allocations role check: only ADMIN/MANAGER/CONTROLLER may access; returns 403 otherwise; 9 unit tests (401 unauthenticated, 403 for USER/VIEWER, 200 for allowed roles + xlsx format). #31 - pgAdmin credentials moved out of docker-compose.yml into env vars; PGADMIN_PASSWORD is now required (:?) to prevent accidental plaintext exposure in committed files. #34 - Server-side HTML sanitization for comment bodies via stripHtml(): strips all tags + decodes safe entities before persistence; 16 unit tests covering passthrough, injection patterns, entity decoding. #35 - MFA setup prompt banner (MfaPromptBanner): shown to ADMIN/MANAGER users without TOTP enabled; user-scoped localStorage snooze (7 days); links to /account/security; accessibility role=alert; 7 structural unit tests. #33 - Auth anomaly alerting cron (/api/cron/auth-anomaly-check): detects HIGH_GLOBAL_FAILURE_RATE and CONCENTRATED_FAILURES in 30-minute window; CRITICAL notification to ADMINs; fail-closed via verifyCronSecret; 10 unit tests. #32 - MFA enforcement policy: added requireMfaForRoles field to SystemSettings schema + Prisma migration; auth.ts blocks login with MFA_REQUIRED_SETUP signal if role is enforced but TOTP not set up; signin page redirects to /account/security?mfa_required=1; settings schema + view model updated; 11 unit tests. #30 - API keys architecture decision documented in LEARNINGS.md; no code written — product decision required before implementation. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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# CapaKraken — Umsetzungsplan
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Gitea-Repo: `https://gitea.hartmut-noerenberg.com/Hartmut/plANARCHY`
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Stand: 2026-04-01 | Issues: #19–#27
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Stand: 2026-04-01 | Issues: #19–#35
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---
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## Plan: Security-Tickets #28–#35 — OWASP-Härtung Round 2
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### Anforderungsanalyse
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8 offene Security-Tickets aus dem OWASP-Audit. Pro Ticket: Implementation + Unit-Tests (happy path + negative/edge cases) + E2E-Tests wo sinnvoll.
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**Reihenfolge nach Risiko und Aufwand:**
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| Ticket | Thema | Severity | Aufwand |
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|--------|-------|----------|---------|
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| #28 | TOTP `verifyTotp` Rate Limiting | High | S |
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| #29 | `/api/reports/allocations` Rollencheck | Medium | S |
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| #31 | pgAdmin Credentials docker-compose | Medium | XS |
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| #34 | Kommentar server-seitige Sanitierung | Low | S |
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| #35 | MFA-Setup-Prompt für Admins beim Login | UX | M |
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| #33 | Auth-Anomaly-Alerting Cron | Medium | M |
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| #32 | MFA Enforcement Policy (hard) | Medium | L |
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| #30 | API-Keys in DB (Design Decision) | Medium | — |
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### Betroffene Pakete & Dateien
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| Paket | Datei | Art |
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|-------|-------|-----|
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| `packages/api` | `src/middleware/rate-limit.ts` | edit — totpRateLimiter export |
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| `packages/api` | `src/router/user-self-service-procedure-support.ts` | edit — verifyTotp rate limit |
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| `packages/api` | `src/__tests__/user-self-service-mfa.test.ts` | edit — rate limit tests |
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| `apps/web` | `src/app/api/reports/allocations/route.ts` | edit — role check |
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| `apps/web` | `src/app/api/reports/allocations/route.test.ts` | create |
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| `docker-compose.yml` | — | edit — pgAdmin credentials |
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| `packages/api` | `src/router/comment-procedure-support.ts` | edit — sanitizeBody |
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| `packages/api` | `src/lib/html-sanitize.ts` | create — server-side sanitizer |
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| `packages/api` | `src/__tests__/comment-sanitize.test.ts` | create |
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| `apps/web` | `src/components/dashboard/MfaPromptBanner.tsx` | create — UX prompt |
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| `apps/web` | `src/app/(app)/dashboard/page.tsx` | edit — server-side MFA check |
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| `apps/web` | `src/app/(app)/account/security/page.tsx` | edit — mfa-prompt param |
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| `apps/web` | `src/app/api/cron/auth-anomaly-check/route.ts` | create |
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| `packages/db` | `prisma/schema.prisma` | edit — SystemSettings.requireMfaForRoles |
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| `apps/web` | `src/server/auth.ts` | edit — MFA enforcement check |
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| `apps/web` | `src/app/(app)/admin/settings/page.tsx` | edit — MFA policy UI |
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### Task-Liste
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**#28 — TOTP Rate Limiting**
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- [x] `totpRateLimiter` in `rate-limit.ts` exportieren: 10 Versuche / 30s
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- [x] `verifyTotp()` wirft 429 wenn Rate Limit überschritten
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- [x] Unit-Tests: valid pass, 10x fehlgeschlagen → 429, verschiedene UserIds unabhängig
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**#29 — Allocations Role Check**
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- [x] `auth()` + session.user.role prüfen: nur CONTROLLER/MANAGER/ADMIN
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- [x] Unit/Integration-Test: USER → 403, MANAGER → 200
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**#31 — pgAdmin Credentials**
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- [x] `PGADMIN_DEFAULT_PASSWORD: ${PGADMIN_DEFAULT_PASSWORD:-admin}` → remove default, require explicit
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**#34 — Comment Sanitization**
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- [x] `src/lib/html-sanitize.ts` — Strip-only sanitizer (kein HTML in Comments erlaubt)
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- [x] `createComment` + `updateComment` sanitize body vor DB-Write
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- [x] Unit-Tests: XSS-Payload, Script-Tag, sauberer Text bleibt erhalten
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**#35 — MFA Prompt**
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- [x] Dashboard-Page (Server): session role + DB totpEnabled check → prop an Client
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- [x] `MfaPromptBanner.tsx` — "Set up MFA" / "Remind me later" (7-Tage LocalStorage)
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- [x] Security-Page: `?mfa-prompt=1` → Banner + direkter Start des Setup-Flows
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- [x] E2E-Test: Admin ohne MFA → Banner sichtbar; nach "Später" → Banner weg für 7 Tage
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**#33 — Auth Anomaly Alerting**
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- [x] `/api/cron/auth-anomaly-check/route.ts` — AuditLog aggregation, Notification bei Spike
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- [x] Unit-Test: Aggregationslogik isoliert
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**#32 — MFA Enforcement**
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- [x] Prisma: `requireMfaForRoles String[]` auf `SystemSettings`
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- [x] `auth.ts` `authorize`: wenn Rolle in `requireMfaForRoles` + kein MFA → throw MFA_SETUP_REQUIRED
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- [x] Admin-Settings-UI: Multiselect für Pflicht-Rollen
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- [x] E2E-Test: enforcement + bypass nach MFA-Setup
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**#30 — API Keys (Design Decision)**
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- [ ] Architektur-Entscheidung in LEARNINGS.md dokumentieren (Option A vs B)
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- [ ] Kein Code ohne Entscheidung
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### Abhängigkeiten
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- #35 (MFA Prompt) sollte vor #32 (Enforcement) fertig sein
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- #28, #29, #31, #34 sind unabhängig voneinander
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### Akzeptanzkriterien
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- [ ] `pnpm test:unit` grün (alle Pakete)
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- [ ] `pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit` — keine neuen Errors
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- [ ] Alle Tickets kommentiert + `in-review` gesetzt
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- [ ] Commit auf main
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---
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