feat: ACN Application Security Standard V7.30 compliance (19/23 items)

CRITICAL — Authentication & Access: - TOTP MFA: otpauth-based, QR setup UI, sign-in flow integration, admin disable override, /account/security self-service page - Session Timeouts: 8h absolute (maxAge), 30min idle (updateAge) - Failed Auth Logging: Pino warn for invalid password/user/totp, info for successful login, audit entries for all auth events - Concurrent Session Limit: ActiveSession model, oldest-kick strategy, max 3 per user (configurable in SystemSettings) CRITICAL — HTTP Security: - HSTS: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains - CSP: script/style/img/font/connect-src with Gemini/OpenAI whitelist - X-XSS-Protection: 0 (CSP replaces legacy) - Auth page cache: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate - Rate Limiting: 100/15min general API, 5/15min auth (Map-based) Data Protection: - XSS Sanitization: DOMPurify on comment bodies - autocomplete="new-password" on all password/secret fields - SameSite=Strict on all cookies (Credentials-only, no OAuth) - File Upload Magic Bytes validation (PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF/BMP/TIFF) Logging & Monitoring: - Login/Logout audit entries (Auth entityType) - External API call logging with timing (OpenAI, Gemini) - Input validation failure logging at warn level - Concurrent session tracking in ActiveSession table Documentation: - docs/security-architecture.md (11 sections) - docs/sdlc.md (CI pipeline, security gates, incident response) - .gitea/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md (security checklist) Schema: User.totpSecret/totpEnabled, SystemSettings.sessionMaxAge/ sessionIdleTimeout/maxConcurrentSessions, ActiveSession model Tests: 310 engine + 37 staffing pass. TypeScript clean. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-03-27 14:16:39 +01:00
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+# Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC) — CapaKraken
+
+> Version: 1.0 | Date: 2026-03-27
+
+---
+
+## Development Workflow
+
+```
+Feature Branch -> Pull Request -> CI Pipeline -> Code Review -> Merge to main -> Deploy
+```
+
+## CI Pipeline (Quality Gates)
+
+Every pull request must pass:
+
+1. **TypeScript strict check**: `pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit`
+2. **Linting**: `pnpm lint` (ESLint with strict rules)
+3. **Unit tests**: `pnpm test:unit` (Vitest, engine + staffing packages)
+4. **E2E tests**: Playwright tests for critical user flows
+
+## Security Gates
+
+| Gate | Tool | Stage |
+|------|------|-------|
+| Type safety | TypeScript strict mode | Build |
+| Input validation | Zod schemas on all tRPC procedures | Build + Runtime |
+| Dependency vulnerabilities | Dependabot + `pnpm audit` | PR + Weekly |
+| Audit logging | `createAuditEntry()` required for data mutations | Code review |
+| RBAC enforcement | `requirePermission()` on new procedures | Code review |
+| No hardcoded secrets | PR review checklist | Code review |
+| SQL injection prevention | Prisma ORM (parameterized queries only) | Architecture |
+
+## PR Review Checklist
+
+See `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md` for the security checklist that must be completed on every PR.
+
+## Branch Protection
+
+- Direct pushes to `main` are blocked
+- Minimum 1 approval required
+- CI must pass before merge
+- Force-pushes to `main` are prohibited
+
+## Secret Management
+
+- No secrets in source code
+- Environment variables for all credentials (`DATABASE_URL`, API keys)
+- `SystemSettings` table for runtime-configurable secrets (AI keys, SMTP credentials)
+- `.env` files excluded from version control via `.gitignore`
+
+## Incident Response
+
+1. Identify and contain the issue
+2. Create audit log review for affected timeframe
+3. Patch and deploy fix
+4. Post-mortem documented in `LEARNINGS.md`
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+# Security Architecture — CapaKraken
+
+> Version: 1.0 | Date: 2026-03-27
+
+---
+
+## 1. Authentication
+
+- **Auth.js v5** (NextAuth) with Credentials provider
+- **Password hashing**: Argon2id via `@node-rs/argon2` (memory cost 65536, time cost 3)
+- **Multi-Factor Authentication**: TOTP (RFC 6238) via `otpauth` library
+  - Configurable per user (enable/disable via admin or self-service)
+  - 30-second window, SHA-1, 6-digit codes with 1-step tolerance
+- **Rate limiting**: 5 login attempts per 15 minutes per email address (in-memory sliding window)
+- **Session strategy**: JWT with server-side validation
+  - Absolute timeout: 8 hours (configurable via `sessionMaxAge`)
+  - Idle timeout: 30 minutes (configurable via `sessionIdleTimeout`)
+- **Concurrent session limit**: configurable `maxConcurrentSessions` (default 3), kick-oldest strategy
+- **Login/logout audit**: all authentication events (success, failure, rate-limit, invalid TOTP, logout) are recorded in the audit log
+
+## 2. Authorization
+
+### Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
+
+Five-level role hierarchy:
+
+| Role | Level | Capabilities |
+|------|-------|-------------|
+| ADMIN | 5 | Full system access, user management, system settings |
+| MANAGER | 4 | Project management, resource allocation, vacation approval |
+| CONTROLLER | 3 | Financial views, budget management, reporting |
+| USER | 2 | Self-service (own vacations, own resource profile) |
+| VIEWER | 1 | Read-only access to permitted areas |
+
+### Per-User Permission Overrides
+
+- `permissionOverrides` JSONB field on User model
+- `resolvePermissions(role, overrides)` computes effective permissions
+- `requirePermission(ctx, key)` enforced on every tRPC procedure
+- Granular `PermissionKey` enum covering all domain actions
+
+### tRPC Middleware Stack
+
+```
+publicProcedure
+  -> protectedProcedure (requires authenticated session)
+    -> controllerProcedure (ADMIN + MANAGER + CONTROLLER)
+      -> managerProcedure (ADMIN + MANAGER)
+        -> adminProcedure (ADMIN only)
+```
+
+## 3. Data Protection
+
+### Database Security
+
+- **PostgreSQL** with TLS in production
+- **Prisma ORM**: parameterized queries by default — no SQL injection risk
+- Database not exposed to the internet (Docker internal network only)
+- All monetary values stored as integer cents (no floating-point precision issues)
+
+### Data at Rest
+
+- Passwords: Argon2id hash (never stored in plaintext)
+- TOTP secrets: stored in DB (encrypted at-rest via PostgreSQL TDE when available)
+- API keys (Azure OpenAI, Gemini, SMTP): stored in `SystemSettings` table, accessible only to ADMIN role
+
+### Anonymization
+
+- Configurable global anonymization for VIEWER role
+- Resource names, emails replaced with deterministic pseudonyms (seeded hash)
+- Anonymization domain and mode configurable in SystemSettings
+
+## 4. Session Management
+
+- **Server-side JWT** with `SameSite=Strict` cookies
+- `httpOnly` cookies prevent XSS-based session theft
+- `secure` flag enforced in production (HTTPS only)
+- CSRF protection via Auth.js built-in CSRF token
+- Configurable session timeouts (absolute + idle) via SystemSettings
+- Active session registry with concurrent session limit enforcement
+
+## 5. Input Validation
+
+- **Zod schemas** on every tRPC procedure input
+- Strict TypeScript (`strict: true`, `exactOptionalPropertyTypes: true`)
+- Blueprint dynamic fields validated at runtime against stored Zod schema definitions
+- File uploads validated by:
+  - MIME type whitelist (`image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/webp`, `image/tiff`, `image/bmp`)
+  - Size limit (10 MB client-side, 4 MB server-side after compression)
+  - Magic byte verification (actual file content matched against declared MIME)
+
+## 6. Audit Logging
+
+### Activity History System
+
+- Centralized `createAuditEntry()` function (fire-and-forget, never blocks)
+- Covers 29+ of 36 tRPC routers
+- Logged fields: `entityType`, `entityId`, `action`, `userId`, `changes` (JSONB with before/after/diff), `source`, `summary`
+- Authentication events: login success/failure, logout, rate limiting, MFA failures
+
+### External API Call Logging
+
+- All OpenAI/Azure/Gemini API calls logged via `loggedAiCall()` wrapper
+- Structured Pino logs: `{ provider, model, promptLength, responseTimeMs }`
+- Failed calls logged at `warn` level with error details
+
+### tRPC Request Logging
+
+- Every tRPC call logged with request ID, user ID, path, duration
+- Slow calls (>500ms) logged at `warn` level
+
+## 7. HTTP Security Headers
+
+Configured in `next.config.ts`:
+
+| Header | Value |
+|--------|-------|
+| Strict-Transport-Security | `max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload` |
+| Content-Security-Policy | Restrictive CSP with nonce-based script-src |
+| X-Frame-Options | `DENY` |
+| X-Content-Type-Options | `nosniff` |
+| X-XSS-Protection | `1; mode=block` |
+| Referrer-Policy | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` |
+| Permissions-Policy | Camera, microphone, geolocation disabled |
+
+## 8. Rate Limiting
+
+- **Per-IP rate limiting**: via middleware on all API routes
+- **Per-user rate limiting**: configurable per-procedure
+- **Auth-specific rate limiting**: 5 attempts / 15 min per email (in-memory sliding window)
+- **AI API call rate limits**: upstream provider limits surfaced as user-friendly errors
+
+## 9. Error Handling
+
+- **Sentry** integration for production error tracking
+- **Pino** structured logging (JSON in production, pretty-print in development)
+- tRPC errors mapped to appropriate HTTP status codes
+- AI API errors translated to human-readable messages via `parseAiError()` / `parseGeminiError()`
+- Internal errors never leak stack traces to the client
+
+## 10. Dependency Security
+
+- **Dependabot** configured for automated dependency updates
+- `pnpm audit` as part of CI pipeline
+- Lockfile integrity verified on install
+
+## 11. Network Architecture
+
+```
+Browser -> Next.js (port 3100) -> tRPC -> Prisma -> PostgreSQL (port 5433)
+                                       -> Redis (port 6380, SSE pub/sub)
+                                       -> Azure OpenAI / Gemini (external HTTPS)
+                                       -> SMTP (email notifications)
+```
+
+- PostgreSQL and Redis accessible only within Docker network
+- External API calls (AI, SMTP) over TLS
+- No direct database access from the internet