feat: ACN Application Security Standard V7.30 compliance (19/23 items)

CRITICAL — Authentication & Access:
- TOTP MFA: otpauth-based, QR setup UI, sign-in flow integration,
  admin disable override, /account/security self-service page
- Session Timeouts: 8h absolute (maxAge), 30min idle (updateAge)
- Failed Auth Logging: Pino warn for invalid password/user/totp,
  info for successful login, audit entries for all auth events
- Concurrent Session Limit: ActiveSession model, oldest-kick strategy,
  max 3 per user (configurable in SystemSettings)

CRITICAL — HTTP Security:
- HSTS: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- CSP: script/style/img/font/connect-src with Gemini/OpenAI whitelist
- X-XSS-Protection: 0 (CSP replaces legacy)
- Auth page cache: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
- Rate Limiting: 100/15min general API, 5/15min auth (Map-based)

Data Protection:
- XSS Sanitization: DOMPurify on comment bodies
- autocomplete="new-password" on all password/secret fields
- SameSite=Strict on all cookies (Credentials-only, no OAuth)
- File Upload Magic Bytes validation (PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF/BMP/TIFF)

Logging & Monitoring:
- Login/Logout audit entries (Auth entityType)
- External API call logging with timing (OpenAI, Gemini)
- Input validation failure logging at warn level
- Concurrent session tracking in ActiveSession table

Documentation:
- docs/security-architecture.md (11 sections)
- docs/sdlc.md (CI pipeline, security gates, incident response)
- .gitea/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md (security checklist)

Schema: User.totpSecret/totpEnabled, SystemSettings.sessionMaxAge/
sessionIdleTimeout/maxConcurrentSessions, ActiveSession model

Tests: 310 engine + 37 staffing pass. TypeScript clean.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-27 14:16:39 +01:00
parent 70ae830623
commit 9d43e4b113
31 changed files with 1337 additions and 107 deletions
+20 -8
View File
@@ -12,10 +12,11 @@ import { assertBlueprintDynamicFields } from "./blueprint-validation.js";
import { buildDynamicFieldWhereClauses } from "./custom-field-filters.js";
import { loadProjectPlanningReadModel } from "./project-planning-read-model.js";
import { adminProcedure, controllerProcedure, createTRPCRouter, managerProcedure, protectedProcedure, requirePermission } from "../trpc.js";
import { createDalleClient, isDalleConfigured, parseAiError } from "../ai-client.js";
import { createDalleClient, isDalleConfigured, loggedAiCall, parseAiError } from "../ai-client.js";
import { generateGeminiImage, isGeminiConfigured, parseGeminiError } from "../gemini-client.js";
import { invalidateDashboardCache } from "../lib/cache.js";
import { dispatchWebhooks } from "../lib/webhook-dispatcher.js";
import { validateImageDataUrl } from "../lib/image-validation.js";
const MAX_COVER_SIZE = 4 * 1024 * 1024; // 4 MB base64 string length limit (client compresses before upload)
@@ -520,13 +521,15 @@ export const projectRouter = createTRPCRouter({
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
let response: any;
try {
response = await dalleClient.images.generate({
model,
prompt: finalPrompt,
size: "1024x1024",
n: 1,
response_format: "b64_json",
});
response = await loggedAiCall("dalle", model, finalPrompt.length, () =>
dalleClient.images.generate({
model,
prompt: finalPrompt,
size: "1024x1024",
n: 1,
response_format: "b64_json",
}),
);
} catch (err) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR",
@@ -568,6 +571,15 @@ export const projectRouter = createTRPCRouter({
});
}
// Validate magic bytes match declared MIME type
const magicCheck = validateImageDataUrl(input.imageDataUrl);
if (!magicCheck.valid) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: `File validation failed: ${magicCheck.reason}`,
});
}
if (input.imageDataUrl.length > MAX_COVER_SIZE) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",