feat: ACN Application Security Standard V7.30 compliance (19/23 items)
CRITICAL — Authentication & Access: - TOTP MFA: otpauth-based, QR setup UI, sign-in flow integration, admin disable override, /account/security self-service page - Session Timeouts: 8h absolute (maxAge), 30min idle (updateAge) - Failed Auth Logging: Pino warn for invalid password/user/totp, info for successful login, audit entries for all auth events - Concurrent Session Limit: ActiveSession model, oldest-kick strategy, max 3 per user (configurable in SystemSettings) CRITICAL — HTTP Security: - HSTS: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains - CSP: script/style/img/font/connect-src with Gemini/OpenAI whitelist - X-XSS-Protection: 0 (CSP replaces legacy) - Auth page cache: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate - Rate Limiting: 100/15min general API, 5/15min auth (Map-based) Data Protection: - XSS Sanitization: DOMPurify on comment bodies - autocomplete="new-password" on all password/secret fields - SameSite=Strict on all cookies (Credentials-only, no OAuth) - File Upload Magic Bytes validation (PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF/BMP/TIFF) Logging & Monitoring: - Login/Logout audit entries (Auth entityType) - External API call logging with timing (OpenAI, Gemini) - Input validation failure logging at warn level - Concurrent session tracking in ActiveSession table Documentation: - docs/security-architecture.md (11 sections) - docs/sdlc.md (CI pipeline, security gates, incident response) - .gitea/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md (security checklist) Schema: User.totpSecret/totpEnabled, SystemSettings.sessionMaxAge/ sessionIdleTimeout/maxConcurrentSessions, ActiveSession model Tests: 310 engine + 37 staffing pass. TypeScript clean. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { resolvePermissions, PermissionKey, SystemRole } from "@capakraken/share
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import { initTRPC, TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
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import { ZodError } from "zod";
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import { loggingMiddleware } from "./middleware/logging.js";
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import { apiRateLimiter } from "./middleware/rate-limit.js";
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// Minimal Session type to avoid next-auth peer-dep in this package
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interface Session {
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@@ -100,6 +101,16 @@ export const protectedProcedure = t.procedure.use(withLogging).use(({ ctx, next
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if (!ctx.dbUser) {
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throw new TRPCError({ code: "UNAUTHORIZED", message: "User account not found" });
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}
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// Rate limit by user ID
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const rateLimitResult = apiRateLimiter(ctx.dbUser.id);
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if (!rateLimitResult.allowed) {
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throw new TRPCError({
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code: "TOO_MANY_REQUESTS",
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message: `Rate limit exceeded. Try again after ${rateLimitResult.resetAt.toISOString()}`,
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});
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}
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return next({
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ctx: {
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...ctx,
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