security: workbook path allowlist + stronger image polyglot validation (#54)

- dispo workbook imports are pinned to DISPO_IMPORT_DIR (default ./imports):
  tRPC input rejects absolute paths and .. segments, runtime reader
  re-validates containment via path.relative. Closes a path-traversal
  class that reached ExcelJS CVEs through admin/compromised tokens.
- image validator now checks the full 8-byte PNG magic, enforces PNG IEND
  and JPEG EOI trailers, scans the decoded buffer for markup polyglot
  markers (<script, <svg, <iframe, javascript:, onerror=, ...), and
  explicitly rejects SVG. Provider-generated covers (DALL-E, Gemini) run
  through the same validator before persistence — an untrusted upstream
  cannot smuggle a stored-XSS payload past us.
- added image-validation.test.ts and tightened documentation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

packages/api/src/__tests__/assistant-tools-dispo-import-batch-delegation.test.ts

@@ -58,22 +58,22 @@ describe("assistant dispo import batch delegation tools", () => {
     const result = await executeTool(
       "stage_dispo_import_batch",
       JSON.stringify({
-        chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "/imports/chargeability.xlsx",
-        planningWorkbookPath: "/imports/planning.xlsx",
-        referenceWorkbookPath: "/imports/reference.xlsx",
-        costWorkbookPath: "/imports/cost.xlsx",
-        rosterWorkbookPath: "/imports/roster.xlsx",
+        chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "chargeability.xlsx",
+        planningWorkbookPath: "planning.xlsx",
+        referenceWorkbookPath: "reference.xlsx",
+        costWorkbookPath: "cost.xlsx",
+        rosterWorkbookPath: "roster.xlsx",
         notes: "March import",
       }),
       ctx,
     );
 
     expect(stageDispoImportBatch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(ctx.db, {
-      chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "/imports/chargeability.xlsx",
-      planningWorkbookPath: "/imports/planning.xlsx",
-      referenceWorkbookPath: "/imports/reference.xlsx",
-      costWorkbookPath: "/imports/cost.xlsx",
-      rosterWorkbookPath: "/imports/roster.xlsx",
+      chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "chargeability.xlsx",
+      planningWorkbookPath: "planning.xlsx",
+      referenceWorkbookPath: "reference.xlsx",
+      costWorkbookPath: "cost.xlsx",
+      rosterWorkbookPath: "roster.xlsx",
       notes: "March import",
     });
     expect(JSON.parse(result.content)).toEqual({
@@ -92,18 +92,18 @@ describe("assistant dispo import batch delegation tools", () => {
     const result = await executeTool(
       "validate_dispo_import_batch",
       JSON.stringify({
-        chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "/imports/chargeability.xlsx",
-        planningWorkbookPath: "/imports/planning.xlsx",
-        referenceWorkbookPath: "/imports/reference.xlsx",
+        chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "chargeability.xlsx",
+        planningWorkbookPath: "planning.xlsx",
+        referenceWorkbookPath: "reference.xlsx",
         importBatchId: "batch_1",
       }),
       ctx,
     );
 
     expect(assessDispoImportReadiness).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-      chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "/imports/chargeability.xlsx",
-      planningWorkbookPath: "/imports/planning.xlsx",
-      referenceWorkbookPath: "/imports/reference.xlsx",
+      chargeabilityWorkbookPath: "chargeability.xlsx",
+      planningWorkbookPath: "planning.xlsx",
+      referenceWorkbookPath: "reference.xlsx",
       importBatchId: "batch_1",
     });
     expect(JSON.parse(result.content)).toEqual({

packages/api/src/__tests__/assistant-tools-project-cover-generate.test.ts

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ vi.mock("../ai-client.js", async (importOriginal) => {
     createDalleClient: vi.fn(() => ({
       images: {
         generate: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-          data: [{ b64_json: "ZmFrZQ==" }],
+          data: [{ b64_json: "iVBORw0KGgoAAAAASUVORK5CYII=" }],
         }),
       },
     })),
@@ -49,10 +49,7 @@ vi.mock("../ai-client.js", async (importOriginal) => {
   };
 });
 
-import {
-  createToolContext,
-  executeTool,
-} from "./assistant-tools-project-media-test-helpers.js";
+import { createToolContext, executeTool } from "./assistant-tools-project-media-test-helpers.js";
 
 describe("assistant project cover generation tools", () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
@@ -60,7 +57,8 @@ describe("assistant project cover generation tools", () => {
   });
 
   it("routes project cover generation through the real project router path", async () => {
-    const projectFindUnique = vi.fn()
+    const projectFindUnique = vi
+      .fn()
       .mockResolvedValueOnce({
         id: "project_1",
         name: "Project One",
@@ -84,7 +82,7 @@ describe("assistant project cover generation tools", () => {
       });
     const projectUpdate = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
       id: "project_1",
-      coverImageUrl: "",
+      coverImageUrl: "",
     });
     const ctx = createToolContext(
       {
@@ -119,7 +117,7 @@ describe("assistant project cover generation tools", () => {
 
     expect(projectUpdate).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
       where: { id: "project_1" },
-      data: { coverImageUrl: "" },
+      data: { coverImageUrl: "" },
     });
     expect(projectFindUnique).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
       where: { id: "project_1" },

packages/api/src/__tests__/image-validation.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { validateImageDataUrl } from "../lib/image-validation.js";
+
+const PNG_HEADER = [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a];
+const PNG_IEND = [0x49, 0x45, 0x4e, 0x44, 0xae, 0x42, 0x60, 0x82];
+const JPEG_HEADER = [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0];
+const JPEG_EOI = [0xff, 0xd9];
+
+function dataUrl(mime: string, bytes: number[]): string {
+  const base64 = Buffer.from(Uint8Array.from(bytes)).toString("base64");
+  return `data:${mime};base64,${base64}`;
+}
+
+describe("validateImageDataUrl", () => {
+  it("accepts a minimal well-formed PNG", () => {
+    const bytes = [...PNG_HEADER, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ...PNG_IEND];
+    expect(validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/png", bytes))).toEqual({ valid: true });
+  });
+
+  it("accepts a minimal well-formed JPEG", () => {
+    const bytes = [...JPEG_HEADER, 0x00, 0x00, ...JPEG_EOI];
+    expect(validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/jpeg", bytes))).toEqual({ valid: true });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects SVG uploads explicitly", () => {
+    const svgBytes = Buffer.from("<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'/>", "utf8");
+    const base64 = svgBytes.toString("base64");
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl(`data:image/svg+xml;base64,${base64}`);
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.valid) expect(result.reason).toMatch(/SVG/i);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a polyglot PNG with an HTML tail after IEND", () => {
+    const html = Buffer.from("<!doctype html><script>alert(1)</script>", "utf8");
+    const bytes = [...PNG_HEADER, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ...PNG_IEND, ...Array.from(html)];
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/png", bytes));
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    // Either the IEND-trailer check or the polyglot scan is acceptable — both
+    // reject the payload before it reaches storage. A tail after IEND naturally
+    // fails the trailer check first.
+    if (!result.valid) expect(result.reason).toMatch(/IEND|polyglot/i);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a PNG that does not end with IEND", () => {
+    // Declare PNG and include header but truncate before IEND
+    const bytes = [...PNG_HEADER, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/png", bytes));
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.valid) expect(result.reason).toMatch(/IEND/);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a JPEG that does not end with the EOI marker", () => {
+    const bytes = [...JPEG_HEADER, 0x00, 0x00];
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/jpeg", bytes));
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.valid) expect(result.reason).toMatch(/EOI/);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a MIME/content mismatch", () => {
+    const bytes = [...PNG_HEADER, 0x00, ...PNG_IEND];
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/jpeg", bytes));
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.valid) expect(result.reason).toMatch(/mismatch/i);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a javascript: URL embedded in an EXIF-like comment", () => {
+    const marker = Buffer.from("javascript:alert(1)", "utf8");
+    const bytes = [...JPEG_HEADER, ...Array.from(marker), ...JPEG_EOI];
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl("image/jpeg", bytes));
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.valid) expect(result.reason).toMatch(/polyglot/i);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a non-data-URL string", () => {
+    expect(validateImageDataUrl("not a data url").valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects an empty decoded buffer", () => {
+    const result = validateImageDataUrl("data:image/png;base64,");
+    expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

packages/api/src/lib/image-validation.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 /**
- * Validates that the actual bytes of a base64-encoded image match its declared MIME type.
- * This prevents attackers from uploading malicious files with a spoofed extension/MIME.
+ * Validates that a base64 image data URL is a self-consistent image of its
+ * declared MIME type, and contains no polyglot markers (HTML/SVG/script tails
+ * masquerading under a valid image header). Note: this is validation, not
+ * sanitisation — we do not re-encode pixel data. The security goal is to
+ * prevent a user-uploaded data URL from ever passing if it contains anything
+ * a browser could later interpret as markup when the data URL is served
+ * somewhere less strict than `<img src>`.
  */
 
 interface MagicSignature {
@@ -8,16 +13,39 @@ interface MagicSignature {
   bytes: number[];
 }
 
+// Full PNG magic (8 bytes) and JPEG SOI (3 bytes). Older implementations used
+// shorter prefixes which allowed polyglot payloads whose non-header bytes
+// differed from the declared format.
 const SIGNATURES: MagicSignature[] = [
-  { mimeType: "image/png", bytes: [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47] }, // .PNG
+  { mimeType: "image/png", bytes: [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a] },
   { mimeType: "image/jpeg", bytes: [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff] },
   { mimeType: "image/webp", bytes: [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46] }, // RIFF (WebP starts with RIFF....WEBP)
-  { mimeType: "image/gif", bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38] }, // GIF8
-  { mimeType: "image/bmp", bytes: [0x42, 0x4d] }, // BM
-  { mimeType: "image/tiff", bytes: [0x49, 0x49, 0x2a, 0x00] }, // Little-endian TIFF
-  { mimeType: "image/tiff", bytes: [0x4d, 0x4d, 0x00, 0x2a] }, // Big-endian TIFF
+  { mimeType: "image/gif", bytes: [0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38] },
+  { mimeType: "image/bmp", bytes: [0x42, 0x4d] },
+  { mimeType: "image/tiff", bytes: [0x49, 0x49, 0x2a, 0x00] },
+  { mimeType: "image/tiff", bytes: [0x4d, 0x4d, 0x00, 0x2a] },
 ];
 
+// Polyglot markers — byte sequences that must never appear inside a bona-fide
+// raster image. If any of these appears, the decoded content contains a
+// tail/comment section that a browser or downstream parser could interpret as
+// markup, giving us a stored-XSS vector if the bytes are ever served with a
+// non-strict MIME. All comparisons are lowercased.
+const POLYGLOT_MARKERS = [
+  "<!doctype",
+  "<script",
+  "<svg",
+  "<html",
+  "<iframe",
+  "<object",
+  "<embed",
+  "javascript:",
+  "onerror=",
+  "onload=",
+];
+
+const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES_FOR_VALIDATION = 16 * 1024 * 1024; // refuse to decode anything silly-large
+
 /**
  * Detects the actual MIME type of a binary buffer by checking magic bytes.
  * Returns null if no known image signature matches.
@@ -37,12 +65,76 @@ export function detectImageMime(buffer: Uint8Array): string | null {
   return null;
 }
 
+function endsWith(buffer: Uint8Array, tail: number[]): boolean {
+  if (buffer.length < tail.length) return false;
+  const offset = buffer.length - tail.length;
+  return tail.every((b, i) => buffer[offset + i] === b);
+}
+
+function validateTrailer(
+  mime: string,
+  buffer: Uint8Array,
+): { valid: true } | { valid: false; reason: string } {
+  if (mime === "image/png") {
+    // PNG ends with the IEND chunk: 0x49 0x45 0x4e 0x44 0xae 0x42 0x60 0x82.
+    // Anything after IEND is a polyglot tail and is rejected.
+    if (!endsWith(buffer, [0x49, 0x45, 0x4e, 0x44, 0xae, 0x42, 0x60, 0x82])) {
+      return { valid: false, reason: "PNG does not end with a well-formed IEND chunk." };
+    }
+  }
+  if (mime === "image/jpeg") {
+    // JPEG must end with the EOI marker 0xFFD9.
+    if (!endsWith(buffer, [0xff, 0xd9])) {
+      return { valid: false, reason: "JPEG does not end with a well-formed EOI marker." };
+    }
+  }
+  return { valid: true };
+}
+
+function scanForPolyglotMarkers(
+  buffer: Uint8Array,
+): { valid: true } | { valid: false; reason: string } {
+  // Only the "textual" portion of an image — comments, EXIF text blocks, tail
+  // after the declared trailer — could carry HTML. We do a full-buffer scan
+  // because those regions can legitimately appear anywhere in the byte stream.
+  // Buffers up to MAX_IMAGE_BYTES_FOR_VALIDATION are cheap to scan linearly.
+  const asText = Buffer.from(buffer).toString("latin1").toLowerCase();
+  for (const marker of POLYGLOT_MARKERS) {
+    if (asText.includes(marker)) {
+      return {
+        valid: false,
+        reason: `Image contains a polyglot marker ("${marker}") — likely a disguised markup payload.`,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+  return { valid: true };
+}
+
+function decodeBase64Safe(
+  base64: string,
+): { ok: true; buffer: Uint8Array } | { ok: false; reason: string } {
+  try {
+    const buffer = Buffer.from(base64, "base64");
+    if (buffer.length === 0) return { ok: false, reason: "Decoded image is empty." };
+    if (buffer.length > MAX_IMAGE_BYTES_FOR_VALIDATION) {
+      return { ok: false, reason: "Decoded image exceeds validation size budget." };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, buffer };
+  } catch {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "Invalid base64 encoding." };
+  }
+}
+
 /**
- * Validates a data URL by comparing its declared MIME type against the actual magic bytes.
+ * Validates a data URL by comparing its declared MIME type against the actual
+ * magic bytes AND by decoding the full buffer to verify a consistent trailer
+ * and the absence of polyglot markup markers.
+ *
  * Returns { valid: true } or { valid: false, reason: string }.
  */
-export function validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl: string): { valid: true } | { valid: false; reason: string } {
-  // Parse the data URL
+export function validateImageDataUrl(
+  dataUrl: string,
+): { valid: true } | { valid: false; reason: string } {
   const match = dataUrl.match(/^data:(image\/[a-z+]+);base64,(.+)$/i);
   if (!match) {
     return { valid: false, reason: "Not a valid base64 image data URL." };
@@ -51,21 +143,22 @@ export function validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl: string): { valid: true } | { valid
   const declaredMime = match[1]!.toLowerCase();
   const base64 = match[2]!;
 
-  // Decode at least the first 16 bytes for signature checking
-  let buffer: Uint8Array;
-  try {
-    const chunk = base64.slice(0, 24); // 24 base64 chars = 18 bytes, more than enough
-    buffer = Uint8Array.from(atob(chunk), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
-  } catch {
-    return { valid: false, reason: "Invalid base64 encoding." };
+  // Explicitly reject SVG — it is XML and can carry <script>. We do not accept
+  // vector uploads here regardless of how cleanly the payload decodes.
+  if (declaredMime === "image/svg+xml" || declaredMime === "image/svg") {
+    return { valid: false, reason: "SVG uploads are not permitted." };
   }
 
-  const actualMime = detectImageMime(buffer);
+  const decoded = decodeBase64Safe(base64);
+  if (!decoded.ok) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: decoded.reason };
+  }
+
+  const actualMime = detectImageMime(decoded.buffer);
   if (!actualMime) {
     return { valid: false, reason: "File content does not match any known image format." };
   }
 
-  // Allow JPEG variants (image/jpeg matches image/jpg header)
   const normalize = (m: string) => m.replace("image/jpg", "image/jpeg");
   if (normalize(declaredMime) !== normalize(actualMime)) {
     return {
@@ -74,5 +167,11 @@ export function validateImageDataUrl(dataUrl: string): { valid: true } | { valid
     };
   }
 
+  const trailer = validateTrailer(actualMime, decoded.buffer);
+  if (!trailer.valid) return trailer;
+
+  const polyglot = scanForPolyglotMarkers(decoded.buffer);
+  if (!polyglot.valid) return polyglot;
+
   return { valid: true };
 }

packages/api/src/router/dispo-procedure-support.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
-import {
-  DispoStagedRecordType,
-  ImportBatchStatus,
-  StagedRecordStatus,
-} from "@capakraken/db";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { DispoStagedRecordType, ImportBatchStatus, StagedRecordStatus } from "@capakraken/db";
 import {
   assessDispoImportReadiness,
   stageDispoImportBatch as stageDispoImportBatchApplication,
@@ -34,12 +31,24 @@ const paginationSchema = z.object({
 const importBatchStatusSchema = z.nativeEnum(ImportBatchStatus);
 const stagedRecordStatusSchema = z.nativeEnum(StagedRecordStatus);
 const stagedRecordTypeSchema = z.nativeEnum(DispoStagedRecordType);
+// Reject absolute paths and paths that contain `..` segments at the router
+// boundary. The workbook reader re-validates against DISPO_IMPORT_DIR as
+// defence-in-depth, but rejecting early here gives a clearer error to admin
+// users and shrinks the attack surface if the reader is ever called with a
+// different allowlist policy.
 const workbookPathSchema = z
   .string()
   .trim()
   .min(1, "Workbook path is required.")
+  .max(4096, "Workbook path is too long.")
   .refine((value) => value.toLowerCase().endsWith(".xlsx"), {
     message: "Only .xlsx workbook paths are supported.",
+  })
+  .refine((value) => !path.isAbsolute(value), {
+    message: "Workbook path must be relative to the configured import directory.",
+  })
+  .refine((value) => !value.split(/[\\/]/).some((segment) => segment === ".."), {
+    message: "Workbook path must not contain parent-directory segments.",
   });
 
 export const stageImportBatchInputSchema = z.object({
@@ -120,17 +129,16 @@ type ListStagedUnresolvedRecordsInput = z.infer<typeof listStagedUnresolvedRecor
 type ResolveStagedRecordInput = z.infer<typeof resolveStagedRecordInputSchema>;
 type CommitImportBatchInput = z.infer<typeof commitImportBatchInputSchema>;
 
-export async function stageImportBatch(
-  ctx: DispoProcedureContext,
-  input: StageImportBatchInput,
-) {
+export async function stageImportBatch(ctx: DispoProcedureContext, input: StageImportBatchInput) {
   return stageDispoImportBatchApplication(ctx.db, {
     chargeabilityWorkbookPath: input.chargeabilityWorkbookPath,
     planningWorkbookPath: input.planningWorkbookPath,
     referenceWorkbookPath: input.referenceWorkbookPath,
     ...(input.costWorkbookPath !== undefined ? { costWorkbookPath: input.costWorkbookPath } : {}),
     ...(input.notes !== undefined ? { notes: input.notes } : {}),
-    ...(input.rosterWorkbookPath !== undefined ? { rosterWorkbookPath: input.rosterWorkbookPath } : {}),
+    ...(input.rosterWorkbookPath !== undefined
+      ? { rosterWorkbookPath: input.rosterWorkbookPath }
+      : {}),
   });
 }
 
@@ -142,7 +150,9 @@ export async function validateImportBatch(input: ValidateImportBatchInput) {
     ...(input.costWorkbookPath !== undefined ? { costWorkbookPath: input.costWorkbookPath } : {}),
     ...(input.importBatchId !== undefined ? { importBatchId: input.importBatchId } : {}),
     ...(input.notes !== undefined ? { notes: input.notes } : {}),
-    ...(input.rosterWorkbookPath !== undefined ? { rosterWorkbookPath: input.rosterWorkbookPath } : {}),
+    ...(input.rosterWorkbookPath !== undefined
+      ? { rosterWorkbookPath: input.rosterWorkbookPath }
+      : {}),
   });
 }
 
@@ -200,10 +210,7 @@ export async function resolveStagedRecord(
   return resolveStagedRecordMutation(ctx.db, input);
 }
 
-export async function commitImportBatch(
-  ctx: DispoProcedureContext,
-  input: CommitImportBatchInput,
-) {
+export async function commitImportBatch(ctx: DispoProcedureContext, input: CommitImportBatchInput) {
   return commitImportBatchMutation(ctx.db, {
     importBatchId: input.importBatchId,
     allowTbdUnresolved: input.allowTbdUnresolved,

packages/api/src/router/project-cover.ts

@@ -100,6 +100,18 @@ export const projectCoverProcedures = {
             message: `Gemini error: ${parseGeminiError(err)}`,
           });
         }
+
+        // Provider-generated output is still untrusted — a compromised or
+        // misconfigured upstream could return a polyglot payload. Run the
+        // same magic-byte + trailer + marker check we apply to user uploads
+        // before we persist the data URL to the database.
+        const providerCheck = validateImageDataUrl(coverImageUrl);
+        if (!providerCheck.valid) {
+          throw new TRPCError({
+            code: "INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR",
+            message: `Provider image rejected by validator: ${providerCheck.reason}`,
+          });
+        }
       } else {
         const dalleClient = createDalleClient(runtimeSettings);
         const model =
@@ -135,6 +147,14 @@ export const projectCoverProcedures = {
         }
 
         coverImageUrl = `data:image/png;base64,${b64}`;
+
+        const providerCheck = validateImageDataUrl(coverImageUrl);
+        if (!providerCheck.valid) {
+          throw new TRPCError({
+            code: "INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR",
+            message: `Provider image rejected by validator: ${providerCheck.reason}`,
+          });
+        }
       }
 
       await ctx.db.project.update({