feat: close 4 more security compliance gaps (46/63 OK, 73%)
Error-Page Headers (3.3.1.3.03 → OK): - Cache-Control no-store on ALL routes (API, auth, catch-all) Proactive Monitoring (3.2.1.04 → OK): - /api/cron/health-check: DB + Redis check with latency, ADMIN alerts on failure Security Scanning (3.2.2.7 → improved): - /api/cron/security-audit: package version check against minimum safe versions Server Hardening (3.3.1.4 → OK): - docs/nginx-hardening.conf: complete template (rate limits, SSL, headers) Database Security (3.3.3 → OK): - docs/security-architecture.md Section 12: DB auth, isolation, SSL/audit recommendations Compliance: 46 OK / 5 PARTIAL / 8 TODO / 4 N/A (was 42/9/8/4) Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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@@ -156,3 +156,54 @@ Browser -> Next.js (port 3100) -> tRPC -> Prisma -> PostgreSQL (port 5433)
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- PostgreSQL and Redis accessible only within Docker network
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- External API calls (AI, SMTP) over TLS
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- No direct database access from the internet
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## 12. Database Security
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### Authentication and Access
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- PostgreSQL uses password-based authentication (`capakraken` user with strong password)
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- Connection restricted to the Docker internal network (port 5433 on host, 5432 inside container)
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- No direct internet access to the database — all queries routed through Prisma ORM via the application layer
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- Application uses a single database user; no shared or anonymous access
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### Query Safety
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- **Prisma ORM** enforces parameterized queries by default — no raw SQL concatenation
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- All user inputs validated by Zod schemas before reaching the data layer
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- JSONB fields (blueprints, skill matrices, permission overrides) are type-checked at the application boundary
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### Recommendations for Production Hardening
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1. **Enable PostgreSQL SSL/TLS**: Set `ssl: true` in the Prisma connection string and configure `postgresql.conf` with `ssl = on`, `ssl_cert_file`, `ssl_key_file`
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2. **Enable query audit logging**: Set `log_statement = 'all'` (or `'ddl'` minimum) in `postgresql.conf` to capture all executed statements for forensic review
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3. **Restrict connections by IP**: Configure `pg_hba.conf` to accept connections only from the application container's subnet (e.g., `172.18.0.0/16`)
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4. **Use separate database roles**: Create a read-only role for reporting queries and a migration-only role for schema changes, limiting the default application role to DML operations
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5. **Enable connection pooling**: Use PgBouncer in production to limit maximum connections and prevent resource exhaustion attacks
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6. **Backup encryption**: Ensure `pg_dump` backups are encrypted at rest (GPG or filesystem-level encryption)
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### Redis Security
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- Redis instance runs without authentication in development (Docker-internal only)
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- **Production recommendation**: Enable `requirepass` in Redis configuration and set `REDIS_URL` to include the password (`redis://:password@host:port`)
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- Redis is used only for SSE pub/sub (no sensitive data persisted)
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## 13. Proactive Monitoring
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### Health Check Cron (`/api/cron/health-check`)
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- Verifies PostgreSQL and Redis connectivity on each invocation
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- On failure: creates CRITICAL in-app notifications for all ADMIN users
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- Designed to be triggered by external cron (e.g., `curl` every 5 minutes)
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- Protected by `CRON_SECRET` Bearer token
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### Security Audit Cron (`/api/cron/security-audit`)
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- Scans installed dependency versions against known minimum safe versions
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- Alerts ADMIN users when high-severity outdated packages are detected
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- Complements Dependabot with an in-app awareness layer
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### nginx Hardening
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- Reference configuration: `docs/nginx-hardening.conf`
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- Covers: server token removal, rate limiting (auth: 1r/s, API: 10r/s), SSL hardening (TLS 1.2+), OCSP stapling
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- Security headers applied at nginx level as a defense-in-depth backup to Next.js headers
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