Expand the SSRF blocklist from IPv4-only to IPv6 loopback/ULA (fc00::/7)/
link-local (fe80::/10)/multicast/IPv4-mapped, plus the missing IPv4 ranges
0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT, and TEST-NET/benchmark ranges. Replace the
single-lookup SSRF guard with resolveAndValidate(): resolves all DNS records
(lookup { all: true }) so a hostname returning "public + private" is
rejected, and returns the first validated address for connection pinning.
The webhook dispatcher now switches from plain fetch() to https.request()
with a custom Agent.lookup that returns the pre-validated IP. A DNS rebind
between the guard check and the TCP connect() can no longer redirect the
dial to an internal address. Hostname still flows through for SNI and
certificate validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tests fell behind source changes: lastTotpAt replay-attack prevention,
activeSession invalidation on password reset, select clauses in
permission updates, UNAUTHORIZED (anti-enumeration) for disabled TOTP,
and password minimum raised from 8 to 12 characters.
Also fix root eslint.config.mjs to ignore packages/ (linted via turbo)
and add --no-warn-ignored to lint-staged to suppress warnings for
ignored files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hartmut