- dispo workbook imports are pinned to DISPO_IMPORT_DIR (default ./imports):
tRPC input rejects absolute paths and .. segments, runtime reader
re-validates containment via path.relative. Closes a path-traversal
class that reached ExcelJS CVEs through admin/compromised tokens.
- image validator now checks the full 8-byte PNG magic, enforces PNG IEND
and JPEG EOI trailers, scans the decoded buffer for markup polyglot
markers (<script, <svg, <iframe, javascript:, onerror=, ...), and
explicitly rejects SVG. Provider-generated covers (DALL-E, Gemini) run
through the same validator before persistence — an untrusted upstream
cannot smuggle a stored-XSS payload past us.
- added image-validation.test.ts and tightened documentation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`messages[].content` and `pageContext` had no `.max()` — a single chat
turn could ship 50 MB / 200 messages and OOM JSON.parse, balloon prompt
assembly, and burn arbitrary AI-provider cost. Separately, the
project-cover image-generation path concatenated user free-text into
the DALL-E / Gemini prompt without any injection check, so a manager
could pivot the image model into "ignore previous instructions" /
role-override style attacks against downstream prompt-aware infra.
- assistant-procedure-support: add `.max(10_000)` per message,
`.max(2_000)` on pageContext, and a `.superRefine` aggregate cap
(200 KB total bytes across all messages + page context). Constants
exported so call sites and tests share one source of truth.
- project-cover.generateCover: run `checkPromptInjection` over the
user-supplied `prompt` field; reject with BAD_REQUEST on match.
- 7 schema-bound tests covering per-message, page-context, aggregate,
message-count, and happy-path cases.
Covers EAPPS 3.2.7 (input bounds) / EGAI 4.6.3.2 (prompt-injection
detection on user inputs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hartmut