Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hartmut d1075af77d security: tighten CSP — drop provider wildcards, add object/frame/worker-src (#45)
Browser code never calls OpenAI/Azure/Gemini directly; all AI traffic is
server-side tRPC. connect-src is now locked to 'self'. Added object-src 'none',
frame-src 'none', media-src 'self', and worker-src 'self' blob:. style-src
keeps 'unsafe-inline' for React + @react-pdf/renderer (documented residual
risk — script-src is nonce-based so CSS injection cannot escalate to JS).

Added three regression tests covering connect-src no-wildcards, object/frame-src
'none', and worker-src scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 09:08:40 +02:00
Hartmut b32160d546 security: default-deny /api middleware allowlist (#44)
Previously middleware.ts listed /api/ as a public prefix, so any new
API route added under /api/** was served without a session check
unless the developer remembered to self-authenticate it. The
middleware now returns 404 for any /api path not explicitly
allowlisted (auth, trpc, sse, cron, reports, health, ready, perf) —
adding a new API route is a deliberate allowlist edit. verifyCronSecret
was already fail-closed when CRON_SECRET is unset; added unit tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 09:03:24 +02:00
Hartmut bf8577dbaf feat(auth): proactive session expiry redirect across all delivery paths
- Split auth config into auth.config.ts (edge-safe, no argon2) and auth-edge.ts
  for middleware use; auth.ts now spreads the shared config
- Middleware wraps with auth() to redirect unauthenticated requests to /auth/signin
  before any page render; passes through /auth/, /api/, /invite/ paths
- SessionGuard client component watches useSession() and redirects on
  status=unauthenticated, closing the SPA navigation gap
- QueryCache + MutationCache in TRPCProvider redirect on UNAUTHORIZED tRPC errors
  without retrying; SessionProvider polls session state every 5 minutes
- Middleware tests updated for async auth wrapper and auth-edge mock

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-04-03 10:42:10 +02:00
Hartmut bfdf0a82da security/platform: close audit findings #19–#26
Tests, CSP nonce middleware, SSRF guard, perf-route hardening,
Docker env isolation, migration runbook, RBAC E2E coverage.

Tickets resolved:
- #19: MfaSetup.test.ts — static source tests confirming local QR rendering
- #20: ssrf-guard.test.ts (16 tests) + webhook-procedure-support mock fix
- #21: /api/perf route.test.ts (5 tests) — header-only auth, fail-closed
- #22: middleware.ts (nonce-based CSP) + middleware.test.ts (6 tests);
       layout.tsx async + nonce prop; CSP removed from next.config.ts
- #23: Active-session registry enforcement verified (already in codebase)
- #24: docker-compose.yml REDIS_URL hardcoded (no host-env substitution)
- #25: docker-compose.yml REDIS_URL + docs/developer-runbook.md created
- #26: e2e/dev-system/rbac-data-access.spec.ts (12 tests, 3 roles × 4 procedures)

Quality gates: tsc clean, api 1447/1447, web 189/189 passing.
Turbo concurrency capped at 2 (package.json) to prevent OOM under
parallel test runs.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-04-01 22:14:20 +02:00