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CRITICAL — Authentication & Access: - TOTP MFA: otpauth-based, QR setup UI, sign-in flow integration, admin disable override, /account/security self-service page - Session Timeouts: 8h absolute (maxAge), 30min idle (updateAge) - Failed Auth Logging: Pino warn for invalid password/user/totp, info for successful login, audit entries for all auth events - Concurrent Session Limit: ActiveSession model, oldest-kick strategy, max 3 per user (configurable in SystemSettings) CRITICAL — HTTP Security: - HSTS: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains - CSP: script/style/img/font/connect-src with Gemini/OpenAI whitelist - X-XSS-Protection: 0 (CSP replaces legacy) - Auth page cache: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate - Rate Limiting: 100/15min general API, 5/15min auth (Map-based) Data Protection: - XSS Sanitization: DOMPurify on comment bodies - autocomplete="new-password" on all password/secret fields - SameSite=Strict on all cookies (Credentials-only, no OAuth) - File Upload Magic Bytes validation (PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF/BMP/TIFF) Logging & Monitoring: - Login/Logout audit entries (Auth entityType) - External API call logging with timing (OpenAI, Gemini) - Input validation failure logging at warn level - Concurrent session tracking in ActiveSession table Documentation: - docs/security-architecture.md (11 sections) - docs/sdlc.md (CI pipeline, security gates, incident response) - .gitea/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md (security checklist) Schema: User.totpSecret/totpEnabled, SystemSettings.sessionMaxAge/ sessionIdleTimeout/maxConcurrentSessions, ActiveSession model Tests: 310 engine + 37 staffing pass. TypeScript clean. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC) — CapaKraken
Version: 1.0 | Date: 2026-03-27
Development Workflow
Feature Branch -> Pull Request -> CI Pipeline -> Code Review -> Merge to main -> Deploy
CI Pipeline (Quality Gates)
Every pull request must pass:
- TypeScript strict check:
pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit - Linting:
pnpm lint(ESLint with strict rules) - Unit tests:
pnpm test:unit(Vitest, engine + staffing packages) - E2E tests: Playwright tests for critical user flows
Security Gates
| Gate | Tool | Stage |
|---|---|---|
| Type safety | TypeScript strict mode | Build |
| Input validation | Zod schemas on all tRPC procedures | Build + Runtime |
| Dependency vulnerabilities | Dependabot + pnpm audit |
PR + Weekly |
| Audit logging | createAuditEntry() required for data mutations |
Code review |
| RBAC enforcement | requirePermission() on new procedures |
Code review |
| No hardcoded secrets | PR review checklist | Code review |
| SQL injection prevention | Prisma ORM (parameterized queries only) | Architecture |
PR Review Checklist
See .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md for the security checklist that must be completed on every PR.
Branch Protection
- Direct pushes to
mainare blocked - Minimum 1 approval required
- CI must pass before merge
- Force-pushes to
mainare prohibited
Secret Management
- No secrets in source code
- Environment variables for all credentials (
DATABASE_URL, API keys) SystemSettingstable for runtime-configurable secrets (AI keys, SMTP credentials).envfiles excluded from version control via.gitignore
Incident Response
- Identify and contain the issue
- Create audit log review for affected timeframe
- Patch and deploy fix
- Post-mortem documented in
LEARNINGS.md