Files
CapaKraken/packages/api/src/router/auth.ts
T
Hartmut e01074926e
CI / Architecture Guardrails (pull_request) Successful in 6m31s
CI / Typecheck (pull_request) Failing after 6m9s
CI / Build (pull_request) Has been skipped
CI / E2E Tests (pull_request) Has been skipped
CI / Fresh-Linux Docker Deploy (pull_request) Has been skipped
CI / Assistant Split Regression (pull_request) Successful in 7m23s
CI / Lint (pull_request) Successful in 6m54s
CI / Unit Tests (pull_request) Successful in 9m28s
CI / Release Images (pull_request) Has been skipped
security: reject common/weak passwords on every set-password path (#31)
Adds a synchronous policy check that blocks (1) the curated >=12-char
common-password list (rockyou top, predictable seasonal, admin defaults),
(2) trivial patterns (single-char repeat, short-pattern repeat, keyboard
or numeric sequences), and (3) passwords containing the user's email
local-part or any name component. Wired into all five password-mutation
sites: first-admin setup, admin createUser/setUserPassword, invite
acceptance, and password-reset.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 14:09:38 +02:00

172 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import {
PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH,
PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH,
PASSWORD_POLICY_MESSAGE,
checkPasswordPolicy,
} from "@capakraken/shared";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { z } from "zod";
import { createTRPCRouter, publicProcedure } from "../trpc.js";
import { getAppBaseUrl } from "../lib/app-base-url.js";
import { sendEmail } from "../lib/email.js";
import { authRateLimiter } from "../middleware/rate-limit.js";
const RESET_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
function resetEmailHtml(resetUrl: string): string {
return `
<p>You requested a password reset for your CapaKraken account.</p>
<p>Click the link below to set a new password:</p>
<p><a href="${resetUrl}">${resetUrl}</a></p>
<p>This link expires in 1 hour and can only be used once.</p>
<p>If you did not request this, you can ignore this email.</p>
`;
}
export const authRouter = createTRPCRouter({
/**
* Request a password reset email.
* Always returns { success: true } — even if the email is not registered —
* to prevent user enumeration.
*/
requestPasswordReset: publicProcedure
.input(z.object({ email: z.string().email() }))
.mutation(async ({ ctx, input }) => {
const ipKey = ctx.clientIp ? `ip:${ctx.clientIp}` : "";
const keys = ipKey
? [`email:${input.email.toLowerCase()}`, ipKey]
: [`email:${input.email.toLowerCase()}`];
const rl = await authRateLimiter(keys);
if (!rl.allowed) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "TOO_MANY_REQUESTS",
message: "Too many password reset attempts. Please wait before trying again.",
});
}
const user = await ctx.db.user.findUnique({
where: { email: input.email },
select: { id: true, email: true },
});
if (!user) {
// Timing-safe: don't reveal whether the email exists
return { success: true };
}
// Delete any existing (unused) reset tokens for this email
await ctx.db.passwordResetToken.deleteMany({
where: { email: input.email, usedAt: null },
});
const token = randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TTL_MS);
await ctx.db.passwordResetToken.create({
data: { email: input.email, token, expiresAt },
});
const resetUrl = `${getAppBaseUrl()}/auth/reset-password/${token}`;
void sendEmail({
to: input.email,
subject: "CapaKraken — reset your password",
text: `You requested a password reset.\n\nReset your password: ${resetUrl}\n\nThis link expires in 1 hour. If you did not request this, ignore this email.`,
html: resetEmailHtml(resetUrl),
});
return { success: true };
}),
/** Validate a reset token and set a new password. */
resetPassword: publicProcedure
.input(
z.object({
token: z.string().min(1),
password: z
.string()
.min(PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH, PASSWORD_POLICY_MESSAGE)
.max(PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH),
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ ctx, input }) => {
// Rate-limit keyed on IP (token is always new so token-keying is a no-op).
// We cannot key on the resolved email before the token lookup; fall back
// to IP-only here and apply an email-keyed limit AFTER the successful
// lookup to bound per-email brute-force.
const ipKey = ctx.clientIp ? `ip:${ctx.clientIp}` : "";
if (ipKey) {
const rl = await authRateLimiter(ipKey);
if (!rl.allowed) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "TOO_MANY_REQUESTS",
message: "Too many password reset attempts. Please wait before trying again.",
});
}
}
const record = await ctx.db.passwordResetToken.findUnique({
where: { token: input.token },
});
if (!record) {
throw new TRPCError({ code: "NOT_FOUND", message: "Reset link not found." });
}
if (record.usedAt) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "This reset link has already been used.",
});
}
if (record.expiresAt < new Date()) {
throw new TRPCError({ code: "BAD_REQUEST", message: "This reset link has expired." });
}
// Second-layer limit keyed on the resolved email, so a targeted
// attacker cannot exhaust reset attempts for a known user even if
// they cycle source IPs.
const emailRl = await authRateLimiter(`email-reset:${record.email.toLowerCase()}`);
if (!emailRl.allowed) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "TOO_MANY_REQUESTS",
message: "Too many password reset attempts. Please wait before trying again.",
});
}
// Reject weak/common/identity-related passwords *after* the token is
// validated so attackers can't probe the policy without a valid link.
const userForPolicy = await ctx.db.user.findUnique({
where: { email: record.email },
select: { email: true, name: true },
});
const policy = checkPasswordPolicy(input.password, userForPolicy ?? undefined);
if (!policy.ok) {
throw new TRPCError({ code: "BAD_REQUEST", message: policy.reason });
}
const { hash } = await import("@node-rs/argon2");
const passwordHash = await hash(input.password);
// All three operations must succeed atomically: if session deletion
// fails after the password is already changed, old sessions could
// persist with the new password (CWE-613).
await ctx.db.$transaction(async (tx) => {
const updatedUser = await tx.user.update({
where: { email: record.email },
data: { passwordHash },
select: { id: true },
});
await tx.activeSession.deleteMany({ where: { userId: updatedUser.id } });
await tx.passwordResetToken.update({
where: { token: input.token },
data: { usedAt: new Date() },
});
});
return { success: true };
}),
});