Files
CapaKraken/packages/engine/src/__tests__/blueprint-validator-redos.test.ts
T
Hartmut 019702c043 security: ReDoS hardening on blueprint field validator (#52)
Admin-editable blueprint field patterns go through `new RegExp(pattern).test(userValue)`
— a classic ReDoS sink if the admin account is compromised or the
permission is ever delegated. A pattern like `^(a+)+$` against 30
'a's followed by '!' freezes the event loop for seconds per request.

Three layers of defence:
- Save-time: FieldValidationSchema.pattern now has `.max(200)` and a
  `.refine()` that rejects nested-quantifier shapes like `(x+)+`,
  `(?:x*)+`, `(x{2,})*`.
- Runtime (engine/blueprint/validator.ts):
  - isSuspectRegexPattern() runs the same heuristic. If it fires, the
    field fails validation outright — regex is never compiled.
  - Input strings are sliced to 4096 chars before .test() so even a
    benign pattern against a 10 MB payload returns in < 50 ms.
  - RegExp compile failures are caught and treated as validation
    errors rather than crashing the request.

Tests: 10 cases in packages/engine/src/__tests__/blueprint-validator-redos.test.ts,
including the canonical `^(a+)+$` attack — completes in < 50 ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 09:33:42 +02:00

118 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { FieldType, type BlueprintFieldDefinition } from "@capakraken/shared";
import {
isSuspectRegexPattern,
validateCustomFields,
MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH,
MAX_REGEX_INPUT_LENGTH,
} from "../blueprint/validator.js";
describe("blueprint validator — ReDoS hardening (#52)", () => {
describe("isSuspectRegexPattern", () => {
it("flags classic nested-quantifier shapes", () => {
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(a+)+")).toBe(true);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(a*)*")).toBe(true);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(a+)*")).toBe(true);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(a*)+")).toBe(true);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(.+)*")).toBe(true);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(.*)+")).toBe(true);
});
it("flags grouped bounded-quantifier shapes", () => {
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(a{2,})+")).toBe(true);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(a{2,5})*")).toBe(true);
});
it("flags the canonical ReDoS sample ^(a+)+$", () => {
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("^(a+)+$")).toBe(true);
});
it("flags non-capturing groups too", () => {
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("(?:a+)+")).toBe(true);
});
it("flags over-long patterns (DoS via compile cost)", () => {
const long = "a".repeat(MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH + 1);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern(long)).toBe(true);
});
it("allows common safe patterns", () => {
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("^[a-z]+$")).toBe(false);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("^\\d{3}-\\d{4}$")).toBe(false);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("[A-Z0-9_]+")).toBe(false);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("^https?://")).toBe(false);
expect(isSuspectRegexPattern("^[^\\s@]+@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("validateCustomFields with ReDoS pattern", () => {
const fieldDefs: BlueprintFieldDefinition[] = [
{
id: "f1",
label: "Test Field",
key: "test",
type: FieldType.TEXT,
required: false,
order: 0,
validation: { pattern: "^(a+)+$" },
} as BlueprintFieldDefinition,
];
it("rejects a suspect pattern immediately without running RegExp", () => {
// Craft the classic ReDoS input: many 'a's followed by a non-matching
// char. If the code ran RegExp.test unguarded, this would hang for
// seconds. Because the pattern is rejected at validation time, we
// get a fast failure.
const attackInput = "a".repeat(30) + "!";
const t0 = Date.now();
const errors = validateCustomFields(fieldDefs, { test: attackInput });
const elapsed = Date.now() - t0;
expect(errors).toHaveLength(1);
expect(errors[0]?.key).toBe("test");
// Must complete in < 50 ms — well below the budget set by the
// ticket's acceptance criteria.
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(50);
});
it("still validates benign patterns correctly", () => {
const safeFieldDefs: BlueprintFieldDefinition[] = [
{
...fieldDefs[0]!,
validation: { pattern: "^[a-z]+$" },
} as BlueprintFieldDefinition,
];
expect(validateCustomFields(safeFieldDefs, { test: "hello" })).toEqual([]);
const errors = validateCustomFields(safeFieldDefs, { test: "HELLO" });
expect(errors).toHaveLength(1);
});
it("caps input length before regex.test() (belt-and-suspenders)", () => {
// Even with a benign pattern, a 10 MB input would be slow to match.
// The validator slices to MAX_REGEX_INPUT_LENGTH first.
const safeFieldDefs: BlueprintFieldDefinition[] = [
{
...fieldDefs[0]!,
validation: { pattern: "^[a-z]+$" },
} as BlueprintFieldDefinition,
];
const huge = "a".repeat(MAX_REGEX_INPUT_LENGTH * 3);
const t0 = Date.now();
const errors = validateCustomFields(safeFieldDefs, { test: huge });
const elapsed = Date.now() - t0;
expect(errors).toEqual([]);
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(50);
});
it("handles syntactically-invalid patterns without throwing", () => {
const badFieldDefs: BlueprintFieldDefinition[] = [
{
...fieldDefs[0]!,
validation: { pattern: "[unclosed" },
} as BlueprintFieldDefinition,
];
const errors = validateCustomFields(badFieldDefs, { test: "any" });
expect(errors).toHaveLength(1);
});
});
});