security: cookie + session hardening (#41)

Three related fixes:
- Cookie secure flag now tracks AUTH_URL scheme (https → Secure),
  not NODE_ENV — staging over HTTPS with NODE_ENV!=production used
  to ship Set-Cookie without Secure. Cookie name gains __Host-
  prefix when Secure is on.
- jwt() callback no longer swallows session-registry write failures;
  concurrent-session cap is now fail-closed.
- Session callback no longer copies token.sid onto session.user.jti.
  The tRPC route handler reads the JTI directly from the encrypted
  JWT via getToken() so it stays server-side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-17 09:00:54 +02:00
parent 93a7fbaa4c
commit d45cc00f2f
5 changed files with 216 additions and 34 deletions
+75 -1
View File
@@ -14,12 +14,29 @@ import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
// ── next-auth imports next/server without .js extension which fails in vitest
// node env. Mock the whole module so the error classes can be imported.
// Capture the config passed to NextAuth() so callbacks can be invoked.
const nextAuthCalls: Array<{
callbacks?: {
jwt?: (...args: unknown[]) => unknown;
session?: (...args: unknown[]) => unknown;
};
}> = [];
vi.mock("next-auth", () => {
class CredentialsSignin extends Error {
code = "credentials";
}
return {
default: vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ handlers: {}, auth: vi.fn() }),
default: vi.fn(
(cfg: {
callbacks?: {
jwt?: (...args: unknown[]) => unknown;
session?: (...args: unknown[]) => unknown;
};
}) => {
nextAuthCalls.push(cfg);
return { handlers: {}, auth: vi.fn() };
},
),
CredentialsSignin,
};
});
@@ -82,6 +99,63 @@ describe("MFA CredentialsSignin error classes — code property", () => {
});
});
describe("session() — does not leak JTI to client", () => {
const sessionCb = nextAuthCalls[0]?.callbacks?.session;
if (!sessionCb) {
it.skip("session callback not captured", () => {});
return;
}
it("never assigns token.sid onto session.user.jti", async () => {
const session = await sessionCb({
session: { user: { email: "x@e.com" }, expires: "2030-01-01" },
token: { sub: "u1", role: "USER", sid: "secret-session-id" },
});
const user = (session as { user: Record<string, unknown> }).user;
expect(user["jti"]).toBeUndefined();
expect(user["sid"]).toBeUndefined();
expect(user["id"]).toBe("u1");
expect(user["role"]).toBe("USER");
});
});
describe("jwt() — concurrent-session enforcement is fail-closed", () => {
const jwtCb = nextAuthCalls[0]?.callbacks?.jwt;
if (!jwtCb) {
it.skip("jwt callback not captured", () => {});
return;
}
beforeEach(() => {
prismaMock.systemSettings.findUnique.mockReset();
prismaMock.activeSession.create.mockReset();
prismaMock.activeSession.findMany.mockReset();
prismaMock.activeSession.deleteMany.mockReset();
});
it("throws if activeSession.create fails", async () => {
prismaMock.systemSettings.findUnique.mockResolvedValue({ maxConcurrentSessions: 3 });
prismaMock.activeSession.create.mockRejectedValue(new Error("db down"));
await expect(jwtCb({ token: {}, user: { id: "u1", role: "USER" } })).rejects.toThrow(
/Session registration failed/,
);
});
it("returns the token when session-registry writes succeed", async () => {
prismaMock.systemSettings.findUnique.mockResolvedValue({ maxConcurrentSessions: 3 });
prismaMock.activeSession.create.mockResolvedValue({});
prismaMock.activeSession.findMany.mockResolvedValue([]);
const result = (await jwtCb({ token: {}, user: { id: "u1", role: "USER" } })) as Record<
string,
unknown
>;
expect(result["role"]).toBe("USER");
expect(typeof result["sid"]).toBe("string");
});
});
describe("authorize() — login timing / enumeration defence", () => {
const authorize = credentialsCalls[0]?.authorize;