Adds a regression suite asserting that the read-only Prisma proxy is
still in effect after a tool's executor forwards ctx.db into a scoped
tRPC caller (helpers.ts::createScopedCallerContext). Covers all three
attack surfaces: model writes, raw-SQL escape hatches, and interactive
$transaction / $runCommandRaw calls.
These tests pin the behaviour enforced by 1ff5c33; any future refactor
that unwraps the proxy during forwarding will fail this suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
createAuditEntry now deep-walks before/after/metadata and replaces
values of password, newPassword, currentPassword, passwordHash, token,
accessToken, refreshToken, sessionToken, apiKey, authorization, cookie,
secret, totpSecret, backupCode(s) with "[REDACTED]" before the JSONB
write.
The pino logger already redacts these paths for stdout (see
lib/logger.ts), but DB writes had no equivalent guard — the AI chat
loop at assistant-chat-loop.ts:265 blindly stores parsedArgs from tool
calls (e.g. set_user_password, create_user) into the AuditLog table.
Matching is case-insensitive; nested objects and arrays are recursed to
a depth of 8. Diffs are computed post-redaction so UPDATE entries that
only changed a sensitive field are correctly collapsed to no-op.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expand the SSRF blocklist from IPv4-only to IPv6 loopback/ULA (fc00::/7)/
link-local (fe80::/10)/multicast/IPv4-mapped, plus the missing IPv4 ranges
0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT, and TEST-NET/benchmark ranges. Replace the
single-lookup SSRF guard with resolveAndValidate(): resolves all DNS records
(lookup { all: true }) so a hostname returning "public + private" is
rejected, and returns the first validated address for connection pinning.
The webhook dispatcher now switches from plain fetch() to https.request()
with a custom Agent.lookup that returns the pre-validated IP. A DNS rebind
between the guard check and the TCP connect() can no longer redirect the
dial to an internal address. Hostname still flows through for SNI and
certificate validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`messages[].content` and `pageContext` had no `.max()` — a single chat
turn could ship 50 MB / 200 messages and OOM JSON.parse, balloon prompt
assembly, and burn arbitrary AI-provider cost. Separately, the
project-cover image-generation path concatenated user free-text into
the DALL-E / Gemini prompt without any injection check, so a manager
could pivot the image model into "ignore previous instructions" /
role-override style attacks against downstream prompt-aware infra.
- assistant-procedure-support: add `.max(10_000)` per message,
`.max(2_000)` on pageContext, and a `.superRefine` aggregate cap
(200 KB total bytes across all messages + page context). Constants
exported so call sites and tests share one source of truth.
- project-cover.generateCover: run `checkPromptInjection` over the
user-supplied `prompt` field; reject with BAD_REQUEST on match.
- 7 schema-bound tests covering per-message, page-context, aggregate,
message-count, and happy-path cases.
Covers EAPPS 3.2.7 (input bounds) / EGAI 4.6.3.2 (prompt-injection
detection on user inputs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
batchUpdateCustomFields used $executeRaw to merge a manager-supplied
record straight into Resource.dynamicFields with no key whitelist —
so a manager could pollute the JSONB namespace with arbitrary keys
(e.g. ones admin tools later interpret). Separately, several user-facing
JSONB fields (allocation/demand metadata, dynamicFields) were typed as
unbounded z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()), letting clients ship
multi-MB payloads that flow into DB writes, audit logs, and SSE frames.
- Add BoundedJsonRecord helper (shared) — 64 keys / depth 4 /
8 KB strings / 32 KB serialized total. Conservative defaults; call
sites needing more should use a strict object schema.
- Apply BoundedJsonRecord to the highest-traffic untrusted JSONB inputs:
allocation metadata (Create/CreateDemandRequirement/CreateAssignment),
resource & project dynamicFields, and the createDemand router input.
- batchUpdateCustomFields:
* Tighten input schema (key length, value bounds, max 100 keys).
* Fetch each target resource and verify all input keys are in the
union of (specific blueprint defs) ∪ (active global RESOURCE
blueprint defs) for that resource. Empty whitelist → reject all
keys (stricter than create/update, but appropriate for a bulk
escape-hatch endpoint).
* Run the existing per-key value validator afterwards.
* 404 if any requested id does not exist (was silently skipped).
- New helper getAllowedDynamicFieldKeys() in blueprint-validation.
- 7 new BoundedJsonRecord tests, 2 new batchUpdateCustomFields tests
covering the whitelist-rejection and not-found paths.
Covers EAPPS 3.2.7 (input bounds) / OWASP A03 (injection / mass assignment).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The read-only proxy previously wrapped model delegates to block writes,
but left client-level raw/escape hatches ($transaction, $executeRaw,
$executeRawUnsafe, $queryRawUnsafe, $runCommandRaw) intact. A read-tool
could smuggle DML via raw SQL, or open an interactive $transaction whose
tx-scoped client (unproxied by construction) accepts writes.
- read-only-prisma: block $transaction, $executeRaw, $executeRawUnsafe,
$queryRawUnsafe, $runCommandRaw at the client level. Template-tagged
$queryRaw stays allowed (read-only by API contract).
- assistant-tools: add create_estimate to MUTATION_TOOLS — it uses
$transaction internally and was previously bypassing the proxy only
because $transaction wasn't blocked.
- shared: document isReadOnly flag on ToolContext so any scoped tRPC
caller a tool spawns keeps the proxied client.
- helpers: note the runtime wrap at assistant-tools.ts:739 is
authoritative; forwarding ctx.db verbatim is correct.
- tests: cover model writes, raw escapes, and the allowed $queryRaw
path (7 cases, all pass).
- loosen one estimate-detail test that compared the exact db instance
(fails once that instance is a proxy; the assertion's intent is the
estimate id).
Covers EGAI 4.1.1.2 / IAAI 3.6.22.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rate-limiter now accepts string | string[] so callers can key on
multiple buckets simultaneously. If any bucket is exhausted the
request is denied, which lets login/TOTP/reset-password throttle on
BOTH user identifier and source IP without either becoming a bypass.
Fail-closed: empty/whitespace-only keys now deny by default instead
of silently allowing unbounded attempts (was CWE-307 gap).
Degraded-fallback divisor reduced from /10 to /2 — the old aggressive
clamp forced-logged-out legitimate users during brief Redis outages;
/2 still meaningfully slows distributed brute-force.
Callers updated:
- auth.ts (login): both email: and ip: buckets
- auth router requestPasswordReset: email + IP
- auth router resetPassword: IP before lookup, email-reset after
- invite router getInvite/acceptInvite: IP
- user-self-service verifyTotp: userId + IP
TRPCContext now carries clientIp; web tRPC route extracts it from
X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- timeline-holiday-load-support: deduplicate getResolvedCalendarHolidays
by location key so resources sharing the same country/state/city resolve
holidays once instead of per-resource
- rate-card-lookup: add lookupRatesBatch that loads rate card lines once
and scores locally per demand line, replacing per-line DB round-trips
in estimate-demand-lines autoFillDemandLineRates
- config-readmodels: include _count in utilization-category list query
instead of calling getById per category for project counts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add indexes on Resource(blueprintId, roleId), DemandRequirement(roleId),
Assignment(roleId) — commonly filtered FK columns that were missing indexes
- Replace N+1 batch delete pattern (2N queries) with findAllocationEntries()
that does 2 total queries via findMany({ id: { in: ids } })
- Add take/skip pagination with default limit of 500 to listDemands and
listAssignments to prevent unbounded result sets
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Move CI_AUTH_SECRET from plaintext to ${{ secrets.CI_AUTH_SECRET }}
- Wrap password reset (update + session kill + token mark) in $transaction
to prevent stale sessions on partial failure (CWE-613)
- Rate limiter Redis fallback now uses stricter degraded limits
(maxRequests/10) and logs at error level instead of warn
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Covers estimate list, getById, version snapshot aggregation, rethrowEstimateRouterError,
submit/approve/createRevision workflow procedures. Vacation read covers isSameUtcDay,
list, getById, getForResource, team overlap, and team overlap detail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Covers comment CRUD/resolve/delete, project status transitions and cascade
deletes, dispo import batch read/cancel/commit/resolve, and holiday calendar
catalog read with identifier fallback lookup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3c continued: covers admin settings CRUD with secret handling,
webhook lifecycle with SSRF validation, and calculation rules with
controller/manager authorization boundaries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3c: covers list/getById/create/update for all three routers
including authorization guards, conflict detection, NOT_FOUND errors,
and audit logging verification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tests fell behind source changes: lastTotpAt replay-attack prevention,
activeSession invalidation on password reset, select clauses in
permission updates, UNAUTHORIZED (anti-enumeration) for disabled TOTP,
and password minimum raised from 8 to 12 characters.
Also fix root eslint.config.mjs to ignore packages/ (linted via turbo)
and add --no-warn-ignored to lint-staged to suppress warnings for
ignored files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add deletedAt DateTime? to User, Client, Role, Resource, and Blueprint
models for GDPR-compliant deactivation audit trail. Soft-delete mutations
now stamp deletedAt: new Date() on deactivation and clear it on
reactivation. Migration and test assertions updated accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P2002/P2025/P2003 now map to CONFLICT/NOT_FOUND/BAD_REQUEST with generic
messages. Raw Prisma error details no longer reach the client.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tests expected include: { resourceRoles } but the Prisma select audit
changed the query to select: { ...RESOURCE_LIST_SELECT, resourceRoles }.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves approve, reject, cancel, and request vacation business logic
out of the tRPC procedure layer into packages/application, matching
the pattern used by allocation use-cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prevents mutations from committing without an audit trail if the
auditLog.create call fails after the main write already succeeded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves read, assignment-procedures, assignment-mutations, and demand
procedures into allocation/ so the domain boundary is discoverable
without grep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Allocation bars that have active optimistic overrides (post-drag,
awaiting server confirmation) now pulse subtly via animate-pulse.
The pending set is derived from the existing optimisticAllocations
map keys, requiring no additional state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- applyProjectScenario: wrap assignment loop in db.$transaction to prevent partial updates
- vacation approve/reject: fix TOCTOU race via updateMany with status-guard in WHERE + CONFLICT on count=0
- vacation cancel: wrap vacation.update + entitlement.updateMany in $transaction
- batchApprove: collect mutations, wrap in $transaction, dispatch SSE/notifications after commit
- Fix dead-code bug in createHappyPathDb where $transaction was assigned after return
- Add atomicity and concurrency tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hardcoded dates (2026-03-20 / 2026-04-05) were now in the past, causing
the demand window filter (endDate >= now) to exclude the mock demand
requirement and miss the expected staffing anomaly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four new test files — 27 tests total:
- role-router-auth.test.ts (8): UNAUTHORIZED/FORBIDDEN on all mutations for
unauthenticated/USER callers; MANAGER and ADMIN happy paths
- webhook-router-auth.test.ts (6): adminProcedure guard verified for all
six webhook procedures across USER/MANAGER/ADMIN roles
- comment-sanitization-router.test.ts (4): proves stripHtml runs before
db.comment.create — script tags stripped, plain text and @mentions preserved
- auth-anomaly-check/route.test.ts (+5 unit tests): detectAuthAnomalies()
unit coverage — empty window, global threshold, per-entity threshold, null
entityId, and both anomaly types firing simultaneously
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
- useTimelineDrag: onProjectBarMouseDown and single-alloc drag path now reset
multiSelectRef + multiSelectState before starting a new drag, so the
FloatingActionBar is dismissed immediately when an unrelated drag begins
- FloatingActionBar.test.tsx: 4 regression tests for the null-render guard
(count=0) and all three label variants
- useTimelineSSE.test.ts: 2 new tests — tab hides during pending reconnect
timer (clears timer, resyncs on next open) and first-ever connection fails
before any open (retry open still resyncs correctly)
- assistant-tools-user-admin-inventory-read.test.ts: add isActive to expected
findMany select shape (already in production, test was stale)
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
- Invite flow: admin can invite users by email with role selection; accept-invite page
sets password and creates the account; 72-hour token expiry; E2E tests
- User deactivate/reactivate/delete: new tRPC procedures + UI buttons; deactivation
revokes all active sessions immediately; delete cascades vacation/broadcast records;
isActive field added via migration 20260402000000_user_isactive
- Auth: block login for inactive users with audit entry
- Favicon: SVG favicon + ICO/PNG fallbacks (16, 32, 180, 192, 512px); manifest updated
- Dashboard: GridLayout dynamic-import loading skeleton prevents blank dark area
on first login before react-grid-layout chunk is cached
- Admin users: remove max-w-5xl constraint so table uses full page width
- Dev: docker container restart workflow documented in LEARNINGS.md; Prisma generate
must run inside the container after schema changes (named node_modules volume)
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
- SMTP: SMTP_HOST/PORT/USER/FROM/TLS now all have ENV override support
(previously only SMTP_PASSWORD was env-aware). ENV takes priority over DB.
- docker-compose.yml: forward all SMTP_* env vars to app container + add
Mailhog service (ports 1025 SMTP / 8025 HTTP, always available in dev)
- Password reset: PasswordResetToken Prisma model + authRouter with
requestPasswordReset (timing-safe, no email enumeration) + resetPassword
- UI: /auth/forgot-password, /auth/reset-password/[token] pages +
"Forgot password?" link on sign-in page
- E2E: Mailhog helpers (getLatestEmailTo, clearMailhog, extractUrlFromEmail)
+ invite-flow.spec.ts + password-reset.spec.ts
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
#41 (critical): Replace plain Error throws in authorize() with CredentialsSignin
subclasses (MfaRequiredError / MfaRequiredSetupError / InvalidTotpError).
Auth.js v5 forwards CredentialsSignin.code to the client via SignInResponse.code;
plain throws become CallbackRouteError and the message is never visible.
Signin page now checks result.code ?? result.error for exact code matching.
#38: MfaPromptBanner converted to fully client-side component via
trpc.user.getMfaStatus.useQuery() — disappears immediately after MFA enable
without requiring page reload. Snooze key remains userId-scoped via useSession().
Server-side prisma.user.findUnique call removed from (app)/layout.tsx.
#40: NEXTAUTH_URL default fallback removed from docker-compose.yml.
The variable is now required (:?) — docker compose up fails with a descriptive
error if the value is missing, preventing silent localhost redirect bugs.
Tests: auth.test.ts (5), MfaPromptBanner.test.ts (7), reset-password.test.ts (6)
All new tests green. pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit clean.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
#28 - TOTP rate limiting (verifyTotp): added totpRateLimiter (10 req/30s),
throws TOO_MANY_REQUESTS before DB hit; 16 unit tests including rate-limit
exceeded + userId key isolation.
#29 - /api/reports/allocations role check: only ADMIN/MANAGER/CONTROLLER may
access; returns 403 otherwise; 9 unit tests (401 unauthenticated, 403 for
USER/VIEWER, 200 for allowed roles + xlsx format).
#31 - pgAdmin credentials moved out of docker-compose.yml into env vars;
PGADMIN_PASSWORD is now required (:?) to prevent accidental plaintext
exposure in committed files.
#34 - Server-side HTML sanitization for comment bodies via stripHtml():
strips all tags + decodes safe entities before persistence; 16 unit tests
covering passthrough, injection patterns, entity decoding.
#35 - MFA setup prompt banner (MfaPromptBanner): shown to ADMIN/MANAGER users
without TOTP enabled; user-scoped localStorage snooze (7 days); links to
/account/security; accessibility role=alert; 7 structural unit tests.
#33 - Auth anomaly alerting cron (/api/cron/auth-anomaly-check): detects
HIGH_GLOBAL_FAILURE_RATE and CONCENTRATED_FAILURES in 30-minute window;
CRITICAL notification to ADMINs; fail-closed via verifyCronSecret;
10 unit tests.
#32 - MFA enforcement policy: added requireMfaForRoles field to SystemSettings
schema + Prisma migration; auth.ts blocks login with MFA_REQUIRED_SETUP
signal if role is enforced but TOTP not set up; signin page redirects to
/account/security?mfa_required=1; settings schema + view model updated;
11 unit tests.
#30 - API keys architecture decision documented in LEARNINGS.md; no code
written — product decision required before implementation.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Hartmut