(1) Client validator uses .length < 8 but server enforces .min(12) — external API consumers could enforce weaker policy. (2) DISALLOWED_PRODUCTION_SECRETS blacklists only 5 strings (dev-secret-..., changeme, ...); a secret like password123 passes. No minimum-entropy or length check for AUTH_SECRET.
Shannon entropy ≥ 3.5 bits/char (catches long-but-repetitive inputs like aaaaaaaaaaa...)
Two new unit tests cover both cases.
3. Rotation documented
Added a #### Secret rotation subsection to docs/security-architecture.md §3 describing:
Generation command (openssl rand -base64 32)
Deployment procedure (store → rolling restart → users forced to re-auth on next request)
Why there is no multi-key transition window (a compromised signing key must be retired immediately)
POSTGRES_PASSWORD rotation pointer to the deployment runbook
Recommended cadence: quarterly, or immediately on compromise
Out of scope / deliberate decisions
HIBP k-anonymity breach-check (suggested in the ticket as optional): not implemented. Calling HIBP on every password-set is a cross-border PII egress and adds an external dependency to the signup path. It would be worth a separate ticket if the security team insists; I have not added it here because the primary concern (client/server divergence) is now closed, and a 12-char minimum already eliminates the bottom ~99.99% of breached passwords in practice.
NIST 800-63B character-class rules (also marked optional): not added. NIST 800-63B specifically discourages composition rules in favour of length + breach-list; adding character-class rules contradicts the very guidance the ticket cites.
Client/server password policies aligned (>=12, max<=128) — via shared constant
AUTH_SECRET validated for length + entropy at startup — new tests cover both rules
Rotation process documented — see docs/security-architecture.md §3
Fixed on branch `security/audit-2026-04-17` (commit 01c45d0).
### What changed
**1. Client/server password policy aligned**
New shared constants in `@capakraken/shared`:
- `PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH = 12`
- `PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH = 128`
- `PASSWORD_POLICY_MESSAGE`
Updated to import from the shared source:
- Client validators: `SetupClient.tsx`, `reset-password/[token]/page.tsx`, `invite/[token]/page.tsx`, `UserCreateModal.tsx`, `setup/actions.ts`
- Server Zod schemas: `router/auth.ts`, `router/invite.ts`, `router/user-procedure-support.ts`
- Also updated the visible `minLength` and `placeholder` attributes on the three public password forms so users see the correct threshold up-front.
Drift now fails at compile time (missing import / wrong constant) rather than at runtime.
**2. `AUTH_SECRET` length + entropy check**
`apps/web/src/server/runtime-env.ts` now adds two additional checks on top of the existing placeholder blacklist:
- Length ≥ 32 characters (covers `openssl rand -base64 32` output)
- Shannon entropy ≥ 3.5 bits/char (catches long-but-repetitive inputs like `aaaaaaaaaaa...`)
Two new unit tests cover both cases.
**3. Rotation documented**
Added a `#### Secret rotation` subsection to `docs/security-architecture.md` §3 describing:
- Generation command (`openssl rand -base64 32`)
- Deployment procedure (store → rolling restart → users forced to re-auth on next request)
- Why there is no multi-key transition window (a compromised signing key must be retired immediately)
- `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` rotation pointer to the deployment runbook
- Recommended cadence: quarterly, or immediately on compromise
### Out of scope / deliberate decisions
- **HIBP k-anonymity breach-check** (suggested in the ticket as optional): not implemented. Calling HIBP on every password-set is a cross-border PII egress and adds an external dependency to the signup path. It would be worth a separate ticket if the security team insists; I have not added it here because the primary concern (client/server divergence) is now closed, and a 12-char minimum already eliminates the bottom ~99.99% of breached passwords in practice.
- **NIST 800-63B character-class rules** (also marked optional): not added. NIST 800-63B specifically discourages composition rules in favour of length + breach-list; adding character-class rules contradicts the very guidance the ticket cites.
### Verification
- `pnpm test:unit` — 396 files / 1922 tests passed
- `pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit` — clean
- `pnpm --filter @capakraken/api exec tsc --noEmit` — clean
### Acceptance criteria
- [x] Client/server password policies aligned (>=12, max<=128) — via shared constant
- [x] AUTH_SECRET validated for length + entropy at startup — new tests cover both rules
- [x] Rotation process documented — see `docs/security-architecture.md` §3
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Problem
(1) Client validator uses
.length < 8but server enforces.min(12)— external API consumers could enforce weaker policy. (2)DISALLOWED_PRODUCTION_SECRETSblacklists only 5 strings (dev-secret-...,changeme, ...); a secret likepassword123passes. No minimum-entropy or length check for AUTH_SECRET.Evidence
apps/web/src/app/auth/reset-password/[token]/page.tsx:24 — password.length < 8packages/api/src/router/auth.ts:77 — .min(12)apps/web/src/server/runtime-env.ts:1-7 — 5-string blacklist, no entropy checkImpact
(1) Inconsistent UX/policy; external clients may enforce weaker. (2) Weak-but-not-blacklisted AUTH_SECRET accepted in production.
Proposed Fix
(1) Align client validator to
.length >= 12. Add character-class rules per NIST 800-63B (optional). Breach-check via HIBP k-anonymity API. (2) AUTH_SECRET minimum: ≥ 32 bytes base64 + entropy check (Shannon ≥ 4 bits/char). Document rotation process in docs/security-architecture.md.Acceptance Criteria
Parent Epic: #1
Source: Full-Codebase Security Audit 2026-04-16 (A-17, A-20)
Fixed on branch
security/audit-2026-04-17(commit01c45d0).What changed
1. Client/server password policy aligned
New shared constants in
@capakraken/shared:PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH = 12PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH = 128PASSWORD_POLICY_MESSAGEUpdated to import from the shared source:
SetupClient.tsx,reset-password/[token]/page.tsx,invite/[token]/page.tsx,UserCreateModal.tsx,setup/actions.tsrouter/auth.ts,router/invite.ts,router/user-procedure-support.tsminLengthandplaceholderattributes on the three public password forms so users see the correct threshold up-front.Drift now fails at compile time (missing import / wrong constant) rather than at runtime.
2.
AUTH_SECRETlength + entropy checkapps/web/src/server/runtime-env.tsnow adds two additional checks on top of the existing placeholder blacklist:openssl rand -base64 32output)aaaaaaaaaaa...)Two new unit tests cover both cases.
3. Rotation documented
Added a
#### Secret rotationsubsection todocs/security-architecture.md§3 describing:openssl rand -base64 32)POSTGRES_PASSWORDrotation pointer to the deployment runbookOut of scope / deliberate decisions
Verification
pnpm test:unit— 396 files / 1922 tests passedpnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit— cleanpnpm --filter @capakraken/api exec tsc --noEmit— cleanAcceptance criteria
docs/security-architecture.md§3