afabaa0b7a
Adds lastTotpAt timestamp to User model. After a successful TOTP validation, the timestamp is recorded. Any reuse of the same code within the 30-second window is rejected as a replay attack. verifyTotp now returns a single generic UNAUTHORIZED error regardless of whether the user ID is invalid or TOTP is not enabled, preventing enumeration of user IDs and MFA status. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
314 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
314 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
import { prisma } from "@capakraken/db";
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import { authRateLimiter } from "@capakraken/api/middleware/rate-limit";
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import { createAuditEntry } from "@capakraken/api/lib/audit";
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import { logger } from "@capakraken/api/lib/logger";
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import NextAuth, { type NextAuthConfig } from "next-auth";
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import Credentials from "next-auth/providers/credentials";
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import { CredentialsSignin } from "next-auth";
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import { verify } from "@node-rs/argon2";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import { assertSecureRuntimeEnv } from "./runtime-env";
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import { authConfig } from "./auth.config.js";
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assertSecureRuntimeEnv();
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// Auth.js v5: throw CredentialsSignin subclasses so the `code` is forwarded
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// to the client via SignInResponse.code — plain Error throws become
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// CallbackRouteError and the message is never visible to the client.
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export class MfaRequiredError extends CredentialsSignin {
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code = "MFA_REQUIRED" as const;
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}
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export class MfaRequiredSetupError extends CredentialsSignin {
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code = "MFA_REQUIRED_SETUP" as const;
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}
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export class InvalidTotpError extends CredentialsSignin {
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code = "INVALID_TOTP" as const;
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}
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const LoginSchema = z.object({
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email: z.string().email(),
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password: z.string().min(1),
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totp: z.string().optional(),
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});
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const config = {
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...authConfig,
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trustHost: true,
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providers: [
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Credentials({
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name: "credentials",
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credentials: {
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email: { label: "Email", type: "email" },
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password: { label: "Password", type: "password" },
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totp: { label: "TOTP", type: "text" },
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},
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async authorize(credentials) {
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const parsed = LoginSchema.safeParse(credentials);
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if (!parsed.success) return null;
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const { email, password, totp } = parsed.data;
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const isE2eTestMode = process.env["E2E_TEST_MODE"] === "true";
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// Rate limit: 5 login attempts per 15 minutes per email
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const rateLimitResult = isE2eTestMode
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? { allowed: true }
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: await authRateLimiter(email.toLowerCase());
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if (!rateLimitResult.allowed) {
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// Audit failed login (rate limited)
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: email.toLowerCase(),
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entityName: email,
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action: "CREATE",
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summary: "Login blocked — rate limit exceeded",
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source: "ui",
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});
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throw new Error("Too many login attempts. Please try again later.");
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}
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const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email } });
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if (!user?.passwordHash) {
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logger.warn({ email, reason: "user_not_found" }, "Failed login attempt");
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: email.toLowerCase(),
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entityName: email,
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action: "CREATE",
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summary: "Login failed — user not found",
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source: "ui",
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});
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return null;
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}
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if (!user.isActive) {
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logger.warn({ email, userId: user.id, reason: "account_deactivated" }, "Login blocked — account deactivated");
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: user.id,
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entityName: user.email,
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action: "CREATE",
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userId: user.id,
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summary: "Login blocked — account deactivated",
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source: "ui",
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});
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return null;
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}
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const isValid = await verify(user.passwordHash, password);
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if (!isValid) {
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logger.warn({ email, reason: "invalid_password" }, "Failed login attempt");
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// Audit failed login (bad password)
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: user.id,
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entityName: user.email,
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action: "CREATE",
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userId: user.id,
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summary: "Login failed — invalid password",
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source: "ui",
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});
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return null;
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}
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// MFA check: if TOTP is enabled, require the token
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if (user.totpEnabled && user.totpSecret) {
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if (!totp) {
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// Signal to the client that MFA is required (include userId for re-submission)
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throw new MfaRequiredError();
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}
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const { TOTP, Secret } = await import("otpauth");
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const totpInstance = new TOTP({
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issuer: "CapaKraken",
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label: user.email,
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algorithm: "SHA1",
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digits: 6,
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period: 30,
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secret: Secret.fromBase32(user.totpSecret),
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});
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const delta = totpInstance.validate({ token: totp, window: 1 });
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if (delta === null) {
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logger.warn({ email, reason: "invalid_totp" }, "Failed MFA verification");
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: user.id,
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entityName: user.email,
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action: "CREATE",
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userId: user.id,
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summary: "Login failed — invalid TOTP token",
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source: "ui",
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});
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throw new InvalidTotpError();
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}
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// Replay-attack prevention: reject if the same 30-second window was already used
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const userWithTotp = await prisma.user.findUnique({
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where: { id: user.id },
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select: { lastTotpAt: true },
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}) as { lastTotpAt: Date | null } | null;
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if (
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userWithTotp?.lastTotpAt != null &&
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Date.now() - userWithTotp.lastTotpAt.getTime() < 30_000
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) {
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logger.warn({ email, reason: "totp_replay" }, "TOTP replay attack blocked");
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: user.id,
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entityName: user.email,
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action: "CREATE",
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userId: user.id,
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summary: "Login failed — TOTP replay detected",
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source: "ui",
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});
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throw new InvalidTotpError();
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}
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// Record successful TOTP use to prevent replay within the same window
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await (prisma.user.update as Function)({
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where: { id: user.id },
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data: { lastTotpAt: new Date() },
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});
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}
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// MFA enforcement: if the user's role is in requireMfaForRoles but they
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// haven't set up TOTP yet, block login and signal setup requirement.
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if (!user.totpEnabled) {
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const settings = await prisma.systemSettings.findUnique({
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where: { id: "singleton" },
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select: { requireMfaForRoles: true },
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});
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const requireMfaForRoles = (settings?.requireMfaForRoles as string[] | null) ?? [];
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if (requireMfaForRoles.includes(user.systemRole)) {
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throw new MfaRequiredSetupError();
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}
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}
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// Track last login time
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await prisma.user.update({
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where: { id: user.id },
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data: { lastLoginAt: new Date() },
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});
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logger.info({ email, userId: user.id }, "Successful login");
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// Audit successful login
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: user.id,
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entityName: user.email,
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action: "CREATE",
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userId: user.id,
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summary: "User logged in",
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source: "ui",
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});
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return {
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id: user.id,
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email: user.email,
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name: user.name,
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role: user.systemRole,
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};
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},
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}),
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],
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callbacks: {
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async session({ session, token }) {
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if (token.sub) {
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session.user.id = token.sub;
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}
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if (token.role) {
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(session.user as typeof session.user & { role: string }).role = token.role as string;
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}
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// Use token.sid (not token.jti) to avoid conflict with Auth.js's internal JWT ID claim
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if (token.sid) {
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(session.user as typeof session.user & { jti: string }).jti = token.sid as string;
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}
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return session;
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},
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async jwt({ token, user }) {
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if (user) {
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token.role = (user as typeof user & { role: string }).role;
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// Generate a unique session ID for tracking.
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// We use token.sid (not token.jti) because Auth.js manages token.jti
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// internally and may overwrite it after the jwt callback returns.
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const jti = crypto.randomUUID();
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token.sid = jti;
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// Skip active-session registration in E2E test mode.
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// Test logins must not pollute the active_sessions table — doing so
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// kicks real user sessions when the concurrent-session limit is reached.
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const isE2eTestMode = process.env["E2E_TEST_MODE"] === "true";
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if (isE2eTestMode) return token;
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// Enforce concurrent session limit (kick-oldest strategy)
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try {
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const settings = await prisma.systemSettings.findUnique({
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where: { id: "singleton" },
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select: { maxConcurrentSessions: true },
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});
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const maxSessions = settings?.maxConcurrentSessions ?? 3;
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// Register this new session
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await prisma.activeSession.create({
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data: { userId: user.id!, jti },
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});
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// Count active sessions and delete the oldest if over the limit
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const activeSessions = await prisma.activeSession.findMany({
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where: { userId: user.id! },
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orderBy: { createdAt: "asc" },
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select: { id: true },
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});
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if (activeSessions.length > maxSessions) {
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const toDelete = activeSessions.slice(0, activeSessions.length - maxSessions);
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await prisma.activeSession.deleteMany({
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where: { id: { in: toDelete.map((s) => s.id) } },
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});
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logger.info({ userId: user.id, kicked: toDelete.length, maxSessions }, "Kicked oldest sessions");
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}
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} catch (err) {
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// Non-blocking: don't prevent login if session tracking fails
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logger.error({ err }, "Failed to enforce concurrent session limit");
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}
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}
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return token;
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},
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},
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events: {
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async signOut(message) {
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// Auth.js fires this event on sign-out; extract userId from the JWT token
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const token = "token" in message ? message.token : null;
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const userId = token?.sub ?? null;
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const email = token?.email ?? "unknown";
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const jti = (token?.sid ?? token?.jti) as string | undefined;
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// Remove from active session registry
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if (jti) {
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void prisma.activeSession.delete({ where: { jti } }).catch(() => { /* already gone */ });
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}
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void createAuditEntry({
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db: prisma,
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entityType: "Auth",
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entityId: userId ?? email,
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entityName: email,
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action: "DELETE",
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...(userId ? { userId } : {}),
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summary: "User logged out",
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source: "ui",
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});
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},
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},
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} satisfies NextAuthConfig;
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export const { handlers, auth } = NextAuth(config);
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