security: align client password policy with server, enforce AUTH_SECRET length + entropy (#56)
Client-side validators (reset-password, invite-accept, first-admin setup, user-create modal) previously checked password.length < 8 while every server-side Zod schema required .min(12). External API consumers (or a confused browser UI) could get past the client check but fail at the tRPC boundary — or worse, quietly under-enforce policy compared to what admins expect. Fix: introduce PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH (12) and PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH (128) in @capakraken/shared and import them from every pre-submit client validator and every server Zod schema. Single source of truth; drift becomes a compile error rather than a security finding. Also hardens the AUTH_SECRET runtime check: in addition to the existing placeholder-blacklist, production startup now rejects secrets shorter than 32 chars OR with Shannon entropy below 3.5 bits/char. That covers low-entropy-but-long values like "aaaa..." (38 chars, entropy 0) which would have passed the previous checks. Documented the rotation process for AUTH_SECRET + POSTGRES_PASSWORD in docs/security-architecture.md §3. Verified: - pnpm test:unit — 396 files / 1922 tests passed - pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit — clean - pnpm --filter @capakraken/api exec tsc --noEmit — clean Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ describe("runtime env validation", () => {
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expect(
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getRuntimeEnvViolations({
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NODE_ENV: "production",
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "super-long-random-secret",
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "super-long-random-secret-with-enough-entropy-abc123",
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NEXTAUTH_URL: "https://capakraken.example.com",
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}),
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).toEqual([]);
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@@ -49,11 +49,33 @@ describe("runtime env validation", () => {
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);
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});
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it("rejects an auth secret shorter than the minimum length in production", () => {
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expect(
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getRuntimeEnvViolations({
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NODE_ENV: "production",
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "short-but-random-xyz", // 20 chars
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NEXTAUTH_URL: "https://capakraken.example.com",
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}),
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).toContain("AUTH_SECRET or NEXTAUTH_SECRET must be at least 32 characters in production.");
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});
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it("rejects a long-but-low-entropy auth secret in production", () => {
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expect(
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getRuntimeEnvViolations({
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NODE_ENV: "production",
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", // 38 a's
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NEXTAUTH_URL: "https://capakraken.example.com",
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}),
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).toContain(
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"AUTH_SECRET or NEXTAUTH_SECRET entropy is too low; generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`.",
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);
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});
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it("rejects non-https auth urls in production", () => {
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expect(
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getRuntimeEnvViolations({
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NODE_ENV: "production",
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "super-long-random-secret",
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "super-long-random-secret-with-enough-entropy-abc123",
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NEXTAUTH_URL: "http://capakraken.example.com",
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}),
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).toContain("AUTH_URL or NEXTAUTH_URL must use https in production.");
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