Client-side validators (reset-password, invite-accept, first-admin setup,
user-create modal) previously checked password.length < 8 while every
server-side Zod schema required .min(12). External API consumers (or a
confused browser UI) could get past the client check but fail at the tRPC
boundary — or worse, quietly under-enforce policy compared to what
admins expect.
Fix: introduce PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH (12) and PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH (128) in
@capakraken/shared and import them from every pre-submit client validator
and every server Zod schema. Single source of truth; drift becomes a
compile error rather than a security finding.
Also hardens the AUTH_SECRET runtime check: in addition to the existing
placeholder-blacklist, production startup now rejects secrets shorter
than 32 chars OR with Shannon entropy below 3.5 bits/char. That covers
low-entropy-but-long values like "aaaa..." (38 chars, entropy 0) which
would have passed the previous checks.
Documented the rotation process for AUTH_SECRET + POSTGRES_PASSWORD in
docs/security-architecture.md §3.
Verified:
- pnpm test:unit — 396 files / 1922 tests passed
- pnpm --filter @capakraken/web exec tsc --noEmit — clean
- pnpm --filter @capakraken/api exec tsc --noEmit — clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rate-limiter now accepts string | string[] so callers can key on
multiple buckets simultaneously. If any bucket is exhausted the
request is denied, which lets login/TOTP/reset-password throttle on
BOTH user identifier and source IP without either becoming a bypass.
Fail-closed: empty/whitespace-only keys now deny by default instead
of silently allowing unbounded attempts (was CWE-307 gap).
Degraded-fallback divisor reduced from /10 to /2 — the old aggressive
clamp forced-logged-out legitimate users during brief Redis outages;
/2 still meaningfully slows distributed brute-force.
Callers updated:
- auth.ts (login): both email: and ip: buckets
- auth router requestPasswordReset: email + IP
- auth router resetPassword: IP before lookup, email-reset after
- invite router getInvite/acceptInvite: IP
- user-self-service verifyTotp: userId + IP
TRPCContext now carries clientIp; web tRPC route extracts it from
X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#36 CRITICAL: add .max(128) to all password Zod schemas to prevent
Argon2-based DoS from unbounded password strings.
#46 HIGH: configure pino redact paths so passwords/tokens/cookies/TOTP
secrets are never serialized in logs.
#58 MEDIUM: upgrade dompurify to ^3.4.0 and add pnpm overrides for
brace-expansion (>=5.0.5) and esbuild (>=0.25.0) to patch known CVEs.
Vite moderate (path traversal, dev-only) remains — requires vitest 3.x
major upgrade, deferred.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Password validation: min(8) → min(12) across auth.ts, user-procedure-support.ts,
and invite.ts (aligns with NIST SP 800-63B modern recommendations)
- Error boundary: stop rendering raw error.message which could leak internal
details; always show the generic fallback text
- Add `pnpm audit` script (--audit-level=high) for dependency vulnerability scanning
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce getAppBaseUrl() in packages/api/src/lib/app-base-url.ts:
- Reads NEXTAUTH_URL (trimmed, trailing slash stripped)
- production: throws if NEXTAUTH_URL is missing/empty so broken
localhost links in emails are caught at runtime, not silently sent
- development/test: falls back to http://localhost:3100 with a
one-time console.warn
Replace the duplicated inline fallback in:
- packages/api/src/router/invite.ts (invite email link)
- packages/api/src/router/auth.ts (password reset email link)
Extend GET /api/health to report:
"baseUrl": { "configured": bool, "isLocalhost": bool }
so deployment checks can detect a misconfigured NEXTAUTH_URL.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Hartmut